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The Fate of Durable Solutions in Protracted 
Refugee Situations: The Odyssey of Afghan 
Refugees in Pakistan 
 
Waseem Ahmad* 
A protracted refugee situation is always critical and challenging in terms 
of finding durable solutions. The Afghan population in Pakistan is complex 
and one of the world’s most protracted refugee case load.1 The response to 
Afghan refugees has almost always been structured within the framework of 
“Durable Solutions.”2 However, such traditional approaches are unable to 
overcome the specific challenges stemming from a refugee population that 
has remained in exile for over 37 years. This grave issue needs out-of-the-
box solutions. The international community has focused largely on refugee 
emergencies, but the complexity of a protracted situation is that it has moved 
                                                 
*The author works in the humanitarian sector to protect and promote the rights of refugees 
and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). During the 2015-16 academic year, he was a 
Hubert H. Humphrey Fellow at American University Washington College of Law. I extend 
foremost thanks to Professor Jayesh M. Rathod, Professor of Law and Director of the 
Immigrant Justice Clinic at American University Washington College of Law. I am obliged 
for his extraordinary support and guidance throughout my research work. I am grateful to 
Professor Padideh Ala’i, Professor of Law and Director of the Hubert H. Humphrey 
Fellowship Program at American University Washington College of Law, for her valuable 
feedback and support. I am also indebted to Mr. Yahya Bakhtyar, Researcher and Senior 
Economist at the Planning and Development department in the Government of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (Pakistan), for his treasured comments. Finally, I am thankful to the UNHCR 
Pakistan, particularly Sub Office Peshawar and Commissionerate Afghan Refugees (CAR) 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Pakistan), for their esteemed cooperation. 
1 See Pakistan, U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, http://unhcrpk.org/ (last 
visited Dec. 26, 2016). 
2 The United Nations High Commissioner’s basic functions are defined in paragraph 1 of 
the Statute (G.A. Res. 428(V) at 48). Article 1 of the UNHCR Statute defines Durable 
Solutions under two distinct headings: voluntary repatriation and assimilation into new 
national communities. The second of these headings covers two alternatives: local 
integration in the country of first asylum and resettlement in a third country. 
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beyond the emergency phase and no longer requires mere lifesaving 
protection and humanitarian assistance. Therefore, the political and strategic 
aspects must also be addressed. The return of Afghan refugees in 2002 was 
considered the single largest repatriation by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as of that date.3 Nevertheless, the 
phenomenon of recycling remains a common practice in Pakistan.4 In this 
context, serious questions have been raised over the viability, sustainability, 
and durability of the return and reintegration of refugees in Afghanistan. The 
induction of Solution Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR) as a regional 
approach is a constructive step, though the implementation could be 
challenging and would demand huge efforts. The Afghan case is most 
perplexing because of its long duration, and not because of the numbers of 
refugees involved. Despite the high level of response in terms of 
humanitarian aid, the issue was, and still is, the victim of power politics, as 
well as geopolitical and economic interests. 
This article unfolds the historical aspects of the Afghan refugee situation 
to find the root cause of the massive displacement of Afghan refugees, the 
missing links in addressing the issue, and the common grounds for forced 
displacement in the region to reset the direction of Durable Solutions. The 
main purpose of this article is to examine the effectiveness of the preferred 
durable solution and the fit of the regional solution strategy in the local 
scenario of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Furthermore, the article seeks to 
assess the available government machinery’s capacity and legal response, and 
assistance from UN agencies and humanitarian organizations. Additionally, 
the article aims to highlight the challenges of a sustainable return to 
                                                 
3 Afghanistan: Largest Single Refugee Repatriation Since 1972, U.N. HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (Sept. 3, 2002), http://unhcr.org/3d748f4b19.html. 
4 Susanne Schmeidl, Repatriation to Afghanistan: Durable Solution or Responsibility 
Shifting, 33 PROTRACTED DISPLACEMENT 20, 20, 
http://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/FMRpdfs/FMR33/20-22.pdf 
(last visited Mar.10, 2017). 
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Afghanistan to help draw a future road map that will address those 
challenges. 
The article first describes the roots of instability in Afghanistan that led to 
the massive displacement of Afghan refugees. This is followed by historical 
evidence of the massive influx of Afghan refugees, along with other recent 
displacements in South Asia. This article then focuses on finding a way to 
tackle challenges of the protracted refugee situation based on an analysis of 
the durable solutions available to the UNHCR and the Government of 
Pakistan’s response in handling Afghan refugees. Recycling and the 
urbanization of Afghan refugees provide the basis for analyzing durable 
solutions by identifying missing links and gaps in the UNHCR and 
governmental responses. The lack of domestic legislation for refugees in 
Pakistan and the fact that the country is not a signatory to relevant 
international legal instruments have led to gaps in the legal status of Afghan 
refugees, as well as shifts in their legal status over time. Comparing Afghan 
Management and Repatriation Strategy (AMRS) with SSAR clarifies the 
viability of both strategies. Therefore, the article offers a comprehensive 
context for analyzing the case of Afghan refugees. Lastly, the article offers 
recommendations for policy improvements, based upon the conclusions 
drawn from analysis. These improvements specifically target all levels of 
pragmatic policies and practices for relevant stakeholders to bring about the 
end of the protracted refugee situation in Pakistan. 
I. ROOTS OF INSTABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN 
Since hitting world headlines in December 1979, Afghanistan is still 
believed to be one of the most severely war-affected and politically unstable 
countries in the world.5 In the last four decades, the political instability in 
Afghanistan has led to an economic recession that propelled the social, 
                                                 
5 Timeline: Soviet War in Afghanistan, BBC NEWS, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7883532.stm (last visited Jan. 13, 2017) [hereinafter BBC 
NEWS]. 
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religious, and ethnic volatility in the country.6 The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in December 1979 was a decisive event during the Cold War. 
While many historians have claimed that the Eastern and Western bloc 
nations did not engage in direct warfare in the landlocked country of 
Afghanistan; however, each bloc released its political pressure, and the 
weapons of both were decidedly used in Afghanistan.7 
To justify their occupation of Afghanistan, the Soviets claimed that they 
were stabilizing the government’s writ and trying to get rid of the “CIA-
supported mercenaries.”8 Furthermore, the Soviets validated their occupation 
under the umbrella of cooperation as a result of the Soviet-Afghan Friendship 
Treaty.9 This treaty was signed in Moscow on December 5, 1978, between 
Noor Muhammad Taraki (President of Afghanistan in 1978) and Leonid 
Ilyich Brezhnev (President of USSR in 1978).10 According to Article 4 of the 
Friendship Treaty, the high contracting parties agreed to cooperate with each 
other on military matters to strengthen the defense capacity of both 
countries.11 However, to establish close and secure relations, beginning in 
                                                 
6 The Economic Disaster Behind Afghanistan’s Mounting Human Crisis, INT’L CRISIS 
GROUP (2016), https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/economic-
disaster-behind-afghanistan-s-mounting-human-crisis (last visited Jan. 13, 2017). 
7 “Eastern bloc” refers to the communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, which 
were the allies of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. “Western bloc” or the 
“Capitalist bloc” refers to the countries that were the allies of the United States and 
NATO during the Cold War. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. Response, 
1978-1980, OFF. HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/soviet-
invasion-afghanistan (last visited Jan. 13, 2017). 
8 Alam Payind, Soviet-Afghan Relations from Cooperation to Occupation, 21 INT. J. 
MIDDLE EAST STUD. 107, 107-–28 (1989), http://www.jstor.org/stable/163642. 
9 American Society of International Law, Afghanistan-Union of Soviet Socialist 




11 Id. at 2; Article 4 (1) stated, “The high contracting parties, acting in the spirit of the 
traditions of friendship and good neighborliness, as well as the UN charter, shall consult 
each other and take by agreement appropriate measures to ensure the security, 
independence, and territorial integrity of the two countries.” 
The Odyssey of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan 595 
VOLUME 15 • ISSUE 3 • 2017 
1950 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) worked persistently 
with Afghanistan to provide economic and military assistance.12 Despite all 
the aid provided by the USSR to Afghanistan, the People’s Democratic Party 
of Afghanistan (PDPA) regime failed to promote the Soviet’s agenda in 
Afghanistan.13 This led to the frequent change of presidents and the end of 
the monarchy system in Afghanistan.14 The resulting unstable political 
situation provided the opportunity for the USSR to convert its cooperation 
into an occupation in December 1979.15 The USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan 
was the largest Soviet military action since World War II.16 On the one hand, 
the USSR’s invasion was the climax of the Cold War, where tensions reached 
a peak; on the other hand, it was a strategic challenge for the Western bloc.  
According to David N. Gibbs, Professor of History at the University of 
Arizona, President Jimmy Carter considered the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan a solemn challenge to the West and considered it “the greatest 
threat to peace since second World War[.]”17 
The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan exposed the tense relations between 
the superpowers.18 If this was the USSR’s first attempt to use military power 
to expand its territory since World War II, it was also the first time the 
                                                 
12 BBC NEWS, supra note 5. 
13 Id.; The PDPA was a socialist political party in Afghanistan and was strongly supported 
by the Soviet communist government. It was established on June 1, 1965, and in 1967 split 
in to two factions, “Khalq” and “Parcham.” As a minority, the party assisted former Prime 
Minister Daud Khan in overthrowing King Zahir Shah and established the Republic of 
Afghanistan. In 1978, the party also seized power from Daud Khan during the Saur 
Revolution with the help of the Afghan National Army. Beverly Male, REVOLUTIONARY 
AFGHANISTAN 25, 29, 33, 35, 39, 50 (1982), 
https://www.marxists.org/history/afghanistan/archive/revolutionary-afghanistan.pdf. 
14 BBC NEWS, supra note 5. 
15 Payind, supra note 8, at 107. 




18 Payind, supra note 8, at 107. 
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superpowers’ exposition of military force led to a mass exodus of Afghans.19 
The resulting political instability, “Clash of the Titans” (superpowers), failure 
of the PDPA, Soviet invasion, weak rule of law, fall of Najib’s government, 
civil war, Talibanization, and U.S. intervention were all critical factors in 
making Afghanistan the most unstable area in the region.20 This dreadful 
situation left the population of Afghanistan in tatters for an indefinite period 
of time. 
The victory and the victor are still undefined in Afghanistan; however, the 
mass destruction in the country brought chaos to every level in Afghanistan. 
The turmoil compelled millions of Afghans to seek refuge in the neighboring 
countries of Iran and Pakistan.21 Such a mass influx drew an image of human 
and societal insecurity.22 The causal factors of this massive displacement are 
explained in the section below regarding the Afghan refugees’ crisis timeline 
in Pakistan. 
II. DISPLACEMENT IN THE MODERN HISTORY OF SOUTH ASIA 
To contextualize the particular case of Afghan refugees, it is important to 
describe the history of forced migration in the region. The South Asian region 
has been exposed to some of the largest population displacements in recent 
history as a result of “the reorganization of political communities.”23 
According to Susanne Schmeidl, a Lecturer in Development Studies at the 
                                                 
19 Id. 
20 “Talibanization” is a term used for the rise of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. It 
was also referred to as a regime when the Taliban defeated the ruling Mujahideen 
factions and seized control over Afghanistan in 1996 until 2001. The Taliban is a 
fundamentalist Islamic group in Afghanistan and western Pakistan and known for its 
military activities, strict codes, human rights violations, and for the forced imposition of 
Islamic Sharia Law. Razia Sultana, A Study of Talibanization in Pakistan, XXIX (2) J. OF 
HIST, & CULTURE, 119, 133 (2008) 
21 Susanne Schmeidl, (Human) Security Dilemmas: Long-term Implications of the 
Afghan Refugee Crisis, 23 THIRD WORLD Q. 8 (2002), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993574. 
22 Id. at 7. 
23 Id. at 8. 
The Odyssey of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan 597 
VOLUME 15 • ISSUE 3 • 2017 
University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia, in this process of 
reorganization, the effect is sometimes immediate and fast, such as in the case 
of Bangladesh.24 On the other hand, in cases like Afghanistan and Kashmir 
the effect has remained protracted and stagnant. However, all of these cases 
do share the unfortunate common ground of resulting from the mishandling 
of power politics, political volatility, and the presence of political mistakes 
leading to massive forced displacements in the region. 
The first massive displacement in recent history was in the aftermath of the 
subcontinent’s partition in August 1947.25 The partition was an attempt to 
create two states based on religious lines, one for Hindus (India) and the other 
for Muslims (Pakistan), leading to a demographic imbalance in many areas 
of the newly established states.26 The communal violence in the wake of that 
partition resulted in massive bloodshed, as well as the exodus of millions of 
Muslims and Hindus in opposite directions.27 The period of carnage and 
mayhem was just before the creation of the UNHCR in 1951.28 Prior to 1951, 
approximately 14 million people were displaced, which at the time was most 
likely “the largest and most concentrated” forced displacement in modern 
history.29 The lack of attention and willpower by the West and the 
international community was quite clear during this massive exodus, which 
resulted in widespread humanitarian crises.30 Despite the frequent requests 
from the newly established states, the international community gave only 
modest amounts of aid to assist the displaced population, and no specialized 
agency had been established.31 The partition in 1947 resulted in the 
establishment of two sovereign states: India and Pakistan;32 nevertheless, 
                                                 
24 Id.  
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 7-8 
28 Id. at 8 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 9 
31 Id. 
32 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Influx, Humanitarian Assistance and 
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historians consider it as one of the most violent episodes of South Asian 
history.33 
The second largest displacement arose due to the East Pakistan Crisis, 
which led to the division of Pakistan and the creation of a new state, 
Bangladesh, in December 1971.34 As a result of Pakistan’s military action, 
millions of Bengalis migrated from East Pakistan to India in March 1971.35 
Consequently, after the creation of Bangladesh, the non-Bengalis (known as 
Beharis)—persecuted by the Bengali nationalists during the movement of the 
Awami League—left the country and fled to Pakistan.36 In contrast to the first 
displacement, this move captured international attention as a result of the 
geopolitical interest of the West.37 
The third displacement, which was the largest and most recent protracted 
displacement, was the migration of Afghans to Pakistan in 1973 and onwards, 
particularly to the northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the 
southwestern province of Balochistan.38 The flow initially started due to 
political instability; however, the USSR’s invasion accelerated the flow in 
December 1979. The displacement not only attracted a huge interest by the 
international community but also led to an indirect confrontation between the 
Western and Eastern bloc powers.39 Thus, the Soviet-Afghan War was 
considered a crucial and decisive phase during the Cold War. 
The involvement of the USSR in the Afghan civil war between the PDPA 
government (the Soviet-supported group) and the Mujahideen had disastrous 
                                                 
Implications AFGHAN, 37 PAKISTAN HORIZON 40, 41 (1984), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41403907. 
33 Schmeidl, supra note 21, at 9. 
34 Rizvi, supra note 32, at 41. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Schmeidl, supra note 21, at 9. 
38 Rizvi, supra note 32, at 41.  
39 Schmeidl, supra note 21, at 9. 
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results, creating significant turmoil for the people of Afghanistan.40 The 
situation morphed into an endless civil war that left severe, long-lasting 
political fallout and had tragic effects on the people of Afghanistan and their 
neighboring countries.41 Likewise, the 1979 USSR invasion had a devastating 
effect on the Afghan population. The intensity of this destruction has taken 
decades to overcome.42 
The most recent displacement of Afghan refugees was caused by the same 
level of political instability that led to the earlier displacements resulting from 
the 1947 subcontinent partition and the 1971 fall of Dhaka. In terms of the 
international response to these displacements, it became clear that Western 
powers were only willing to act in their own political interests by limiting 
their role to humanitarian assistance. The West’s minimal response to one of 
the most violent displacements in the modern history of the subcontinent, the 
1947 partition, highlights just how little geopolitical interest it initially held 
in the subcontinent region. This contrasts greatly to the enormous political 
interest generated by the USSR invasion years later and the resulting massive 
humanitarian aid. This change in responsive behavior reflects the political 
drivers underlying the humanitarian assistance. 
III. THE EXODUS OF AFGHAN REFUGEES INTO PAKISTAN AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 
The influx of refugees from Afghanistan into Pakistan has been the major 
displacement of persons in the region, which created the longest running 
                                                 
40 “Mujahideen” is an Arabic word, which means those who are involved in Jihad (holy 
war), which is mostly referred to as a guerilla-type war. In this article, the word 
Mujahideen referred to the Afghan fighters who fought against the Soviet Union. Jihad is 
allowed in Islam when an Islamic confederation feels a threat from non-Muslims. In 
order to protect the Islamic confederation, Muslims are obliged to initiate Jihad upon 
order of the supreme leader of the Islamic confederation. See Mujahideen, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (May 11, 2016), 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/mujahideen-Islam. 
41 Schmeidl, supra note 21, at 10-11. 
42 Id. at 12.  
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caseload for the refugee agency in modern history. In terms of security, this 
exodus of displaced Afghans created severe economic and social 
implications, not only for Afghanistan but also for the neighboring countries 
of Pakistan and Iran.43 Although it went unnoticed until the Afghan refugee 
numbers were at their peak, Susanne Schmeidl has managed to draw a link 
between Afghan refugees and the security dilemmas in Pakistan based not 
upon the size of the refugee population, but the duration of their stay.44 In 
general, the security of the countries providing asylum has been linked to 
refugee influxes.45 However, the high volume of Afghan refugees is not a 
vital predictor of insecurity in South Asia, particularly in Pakistan.46 Whereas 
it is also well-known that security in Afghanistan is of the utmost importance 
for the security of the South Asian region, particularly for Pakistan; 
otherwise, the whole region would face significant challenges.47 
The protracted nature of the Afghan refugee crisis creates its most obvious 
dilemma. On the one hand, this protracted situation makes it a complex case; 
on the other hand, it also raises questions over the effectiveness of the 
UNHCR’s “Framework for Durable Solutions” for refugees.48 The situation 
also emphasizes the importance of finding political solutions and self-
determined approaches in addressing Afghan refugee problems, rather than 
remaining dependent on foreign humanitarian aid. 
                                                 
43 Id. at 10.  
44 Id. at 7. 
45 Id. at 13.  
46 Id. at 7. 
47 Sanam Noor, Afghan Refugees After 9/11, 59 PAKISTAN INST. INT’L AFFAIRS 59, 62 
(2006), http://www.jstor.org/stable/41394381. 
48 The “Framework for Durable Solutions” for refugees and persons of concern is a 
framework that aims to achieve, through development assistance for refugees, 
repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development through local 
integration, sharing burdens and responsibilities more equitably and building capacities to 
receive and protect refugees. Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons 
of Concern, U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES 3 (May 2003) (on file with 
author). 
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A. Protracted Refugee Situation 
When refugees have lived in exile for a period of more than five years, and 
they still have no prospects of finding a durable solution to their plight, their 
situation can be termed a “protracted refugee situation”.49 
To understand the nature of Afghan refugee situation, it is important to be 
familiar with the term protracted refugee situation. According to the 
UNHCR, the term was introduced to the international policy and research 
agenda in 2000 and 2001.50 The term was defined by the UNHCR as: 
One in which refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and 
intractable state of limbo. Their lives may not be at risk, but their 
basic rights and social, psychological and essential needs remain 
unfulfilled after years in exile. A refugee in this situation is often 
unable to break free from enforced reliance on external assistance.51 
The unstoppable influx of Afghan refugees’ to Pakistan started in May 
1978.52 One opinion documents an average, 44,118 individuals had taken 
refuge between May 1978 and December 1983,53 whilst, in another opinion, 
the influx of Afghan refugees in Pakistan had risen from 12,000 in November 
1978 to 462,000 in January 1980.54 Initially, Pakistan did not realize the 
magnitude of the exodus; however, it soon realized the scope of the Afghan 
influx, and requested international assistance in April 1979.55 After two 
assessment missions, the UNHCR established an office in Islamabad in 
                                                 
49 Nasreen Ghufran, Afghans in Pakistan: A ‘Protracted Refugee Situation’, POL’Y 
PERSPECTIVES 117 (Apr. 2008), 
http://www.jstor.org.proxy.seattleu.edu/stable/pdf/42909537.pdf.  
50 The State of the World’s Refugees 2006: Human Displacement in the New Millennium, 
U.N. HIGH COMMISSION FOR REFUGEES 121 (2006), 
http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/4444afcb0.pdf. 
51 Executive Comm. of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Standing Committee, 30th 
Meeting, Protracted Refugee Situations, ¶3, U.N. Doc. EC/54/SC/CRP.14 (June 10, 
2004), http://www.unhcr.org/40c982172.pdf. 
52 Rizvi, supra note 32, at 41. 
53 Id. 
54 Noor, supra note 47, at 62. 
55 Id. 
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October of 1979, and raised 15 million dollars to assist Afghan refugees.56 
Additionally, in 1980 the UN agency, keeping in mind the gateway of the 
influx, opened its Sub Office (SO) in Peshawar, the capital of the Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan.57 In the context of the refugee influx, the 
UNHCR SO in Peshawar recorded that the influx was accelerated by the 
Soviet invasion, which had reached two million in 1981.58 While estimates 
may differ regarding the number of Afghan refugees who started pouring into 
Pakistan, an interesting commonality among all the sources is that the influx 
of refugees in Pakistan is directly correlated with the tensions in Afghanistan 
during the first decade of displacement.59 
1. Timeline of Afghan Refugee Crises 
Since the 1970s, Pakistan has experienced several waves of refugees as a 
tragic consequence of over 30 years of conflict in Afghanistan. The intensity 
of the waves was contingent upon the uproar and strife in Afghanistan.60 The 
intensity of the turbulence in Afghanistan was too high to affect the whole 
region; however, its impact on Pakistan was, and is, quite visible because of 
the geography and similar demographics of the conflicted (Afghanistan) and 
the host (Pakistan) countries, particularly in the border areas.61 In order to 
understand the various movements of refugees into Pakistan, it is important 
to know about the Durand Line, the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan 
that was drawn in 1893.62 Afghanistan shares a border with Pakistan in the 
east and south, Iran in the west, China in the northeast, and Turkmenistan, 
                                                 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 63. 
58 Id. 
59 Rizvi, supra note 32, at 41. 
60 Id. 
61 Noor, supra note 47, at 61-62. 
62 Ijaz Hussain, The Durand Agreement in the Light of Certain Recent International 
Conventions, 18 NOMOS VERLAGSGESELLSCHAFTMBHVERLAGSGESELLSCHAFTMBH255, 
255 (1985) (Available at 
http://www.jstor.org.proxy.seattleu.edu/stable/pdf/43109459.pdf.) 
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Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in the north.63 The Durand Line is the longest 
border of both Afghanistan and Pakistan (1,200 miles approximately), and 
also the most dangerous and porous.64 From both historical and modern 
geopolitical and geostrategic perspectives, the Durand Line border has held 
huge strategic importance not only for both Afghanistan and Pakistan but also 
for the super-powers. It is impossible for both Afghanistan and Pakistan to 
monitor and control the movements of persons, especially refugees, through 
the border.65 The creation of the Durand Line led to the division of major 
ethnicities, Baloch and Pashtuns.66 During the displacement of Afghans, most 
of the displaced population from the eastern and northeastern provinces, such 
as Kunar, Kunduz, and Nangarhar, took refuge in the northwestern province 
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa of Pakistan.67 Similarly, the religious ethnicities of 
Afghan refugees also played a vital role in determining their eventual 
destinations.68 For example, the Persian Shia-Muslims moved to Iran, whilst 
the Pashto-speaking Sunni-Muslims settled in the province of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa of Pakistan.69 
The various crises in Afghanistan compelled the people of Afghanistan to 
flee several times for refuge in the neighboring countries, mostly Pakistan 
and Iran. As a result of various awful crises in Afghanistan, the different 
influxes of refugees into Pakistan have been recorded as different historical 
phases: 
                                                 
63 Noor, supra note 47, at 61. 
64 Study on Cross Border Population Movements Between Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES 5, 13 (July 2009), 
http://www.unhcr.org/4ad448670.pdf. 
65 Id. at 5, 13. 
66 Id. at 13. 
67 Mehmet Ali Emir Aydintan, Soviet-Afghan War: The Factors Beneaththe Invasion 
133 (Sept. 2013), 
http://repository.bilkent.edu.tr/bitstream/handle/11693/15658/0006376.pdf?sequence=1&
isAllowed=y. 
68 Noor, supra note 47, at 60-61. 
69 Id. at 61. 
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 The mass exodus of Afghan refugees to Pakistan started in 1979 
as result of the military coup of 1978.70 However, the first 
migration of Afghan refugees started in 1973, shortly after 
Muhammad Daud Khan overthrew King Zahir Shah in a 
military coup on July 17, 1973.71 Daud Khan ended the 
monarchy and declared himself the first president of 
Afghanistan.72 As a result of this political shift, some 1,400 
“political dissidents” sought asylum in Pakistan.73 Most of these 
dissidents were politically prominent and had assets and 
contacts in Pakistan.74 Most of them settled in Europe and North 
America, for business and family reunification purposes.75 
 The second phase (1978-1988) was considered the most 
prolonged phase in terms of displacement. The largest influx of 
Afghan refugees started in 1978 as a result of the attempt to 
establish “a socialist state.”76 The influx of Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan was triggered by the “Soviet-sponsored Saur 
Revolution” in 1978 and then by the USSR invasion in 
December 1979.77 As a result of the Saur Revolution, Noor 
Muhammad Taraki of the PDPA, with the support of Colonel 
Abdul Qadir, seized power from Muhammed Daud Khan in 
April of 1978.78 The political power had been equally 
                                                 
70 Id. at 60. 
71 Rizvi, supra note 32, at 41 n.3.  
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 42-43. 
75 Id. 
76 Noor, supra note 47, at 60.  
77 The “Saur Revolution” was a Soviet-sponsored revolution led by the PDPA against 
the rule of self-proclaimed Afghan President Muhammad Daud Khan on April 27, 1978. 
“SAUR,”” the Dari (Persian-language of Afghanistan) name for the second month of the 
Persian calendar, is the month in which the uprising took place. Later on, the revolution 
led to the 1979 intervention by the Soviets and the 1979–89 Soviet-Afghan War against 
Mujahideen. Noor, supra note 47, at 62.  
78 Colonel Abdul Qadir was born in Herat (Afghanistan) and trained as a pilot in the 
Soviet Union. He participated in the 1973 coup of Daud Khan as well as in the coup of 
Saur revolution in 1978. He remained Head of State for three days (April 28-30, 1978). 
He died on April 22, 2014. Henry S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, Ch. 5, 
at 1–6 (Duke U. Press, 1985) http://online.sfsu.edu/mroozbeh/CLASS/H-606-
pdfs/Af&USSR. 
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distributed among the two factions of the PDPA(Khalq and 
Parcham).79 As a head of state in 1978, Noor Muhammad 
Taraki introduced various reforms that faced huge opposition 
by traditional Afghans.80 Many parties were involved as the 
opposition reached its peak, including:Mujahideen, tribal 
factions, intellectuals, who had declared a common enemy, the 
USSR and the Soviet-sponsored PDPA, which were finally 
suppressed by the U.S.-led military intervention in Afghanistan 
in 2001.81 It was considered the most intensified phase, 
becausethe intensity of the destruction in Afghanistan was 
directly correlated with the massive influx of refugees in the 
neighboring countries of Pakistan and Iran.82 As noted above, 
according to the UNHCR SO Peshawar, the refugee population 
reached to two million in Pakistan, when more than one million 
refugees arrived at the northwestern province of Pakistan 
(Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) in 1981.83 However, from another view, 
by 1983 the number of Afghan refugees reached 3.9 million in 
the neighboring countries of Pakistan and Iran.84 The high 
volume of refugees provided not only the justification for the 
intensified conflict in Afghanistan, but it also unleashed the 
facts regarding colossal involvement of the Western and 
Eastern blocs in the crucial and decisive phase of the Cold War. 
During this phase, the UNHCR had also opened its sub-office 
in Peshawar (Pakistan) in 1980.85 
 Phase three (1989-1995) started with the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops, but also with a wave of massacre, civil war, and 
                                                 
79 Khalq and Parcham were the two factions of the PDPA. Khalq was led by Noor 
Muhammad Taraki and Parcham was led by Babrak Karmal. Rizvi, supra note 32, at 41-
42. 
80 Noor, supra note 47, at 60. 
81 Id. at 60. 
82 Rizvi, supra note 32, at 41. 
83 Timeline of Afghan Displacements into Pakistan, IRINNEWS.ORG, (Feb. 27, 2012) 
https://www.irinnews.org/news/2012/02/27/timeline-afghan-displacements-pakistan 
[hereinafter Timeline]. 
84 Susanne Schmeidl, Protracted Displacement in Afghanistan: Will History be 
Repeated?, MIDDLE EAST INST. 4 (Aug. 8, 2011), 
http://www.refugeecooperation.org/publications/afghanistan/pdf/10_schmeidl.pdf. 
85 Timeline, supra note 83. 
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factional fighting.86 Despite the chaos created by the fight 
between Najib’s government and Mujahideen fighters, 
repatriation was also an ongoing process.87 Nonetheless, this 
phase saw a perplexing migration trend.88 While those who fled 
due to the Soviet invasion repatriated, the victims of the civil 
war took refuge in Pakistan.89 Despite the outflow, the number 
of refugees in Pakistan stayed high.90 The conquest of Kabul 
(defeat of the communist-sponsored government of Najib) by 
the Mujahideen raised the curve of repatriation, and, within six 
months, 1.2 million Afghans were repatriated in 1992.91 
However, the curve did not maintain its trend because the war 
did not come to an end for another four years, until 1996.92 
Subsequently, the failure of powersharing between the different 
factions of Mujahideen dragged Afghanistan into another 
devastating phase of the war.93 According to the UNHCR SO 
Peshawar, 74,000 refugees arrived in Pakistan following in-
fighting between Hezb-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-Islami (different 
factions of Mujahideen) for the control of Afghanistan.94 To 
settle this new influx of Afghan refugees, 334 refugee camps 
were established in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, and 
Balochistan provinces of Pakistan.95 
 The fourth phase (1996-2001) revolved around the emergence 
of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan. According to the 
UNHCR SO Peshawar, in 1996, 50,000 Afghan refugees 
arrived in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan 
following the fall of the cities of Kabul and Jalalabad to the 
Taliban.96 During this phase, the various factions of the 
Mujahideen grouped together “to form the United Front” to 
                                                 
86 Noor, supra note 47, at 60-61.  
87 Schmeidl, supra note 21, at 10. 
88 Noor, supra note 47, at 61. 
89 Id. 
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91 Schmeidl, supra note 84, at 4; Schmeidl, supra note 21, at 10. 
92 Noor, supra note 47, at 61. 
93 Schmeidl, supra note 84, at 4. 
94 Timeline, supra note 83. 
95 Id.; Noor, supra note 47, at 62. 
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combat the Taliban”; yet the Taliban took control of over 90 
percent of Afghanistan’s territory in 1996.97 However, the fight 
between the Taliban and the newly established Northern 
Alliance (an alliance of some of the former Mujahideen 
factions) ended in 1999 upon the fall of the northern Afghan 
city of Mazar-e-Sharif to the Taliban regime, which led to a new 
influx of refugees in Pakistan.98 With the fall of Mazar-e-Sharif, 
the Taliban completely took over Afghanistan, which 
compelled thousands of refugees to enter and reenter (recyclers) 
in Pakistan.99 According to UNHCR SO Quetta, 30,000 
refugees, mostly ethnic Hazaras, fled to Balochistan 
(southwestern province of Pakistan) fearing discrimination and 
persecution.100 According to Schemeidl, the tenure of the 
Taliban was somehow credited with restoring law and order and 
upholding the security situation.101 However, historians will 
never forget the brutality, bloodshed of the religious minorities, 
violations of women’s rights, strict code for the imposition of 
Islamic Sharia law, and ill treatment with the educated and 
moderate politicians. Furthermore, during this particular phase, 
Afghanistan also faced the worst drought in past 30 years.102 
The situation caused many Afghans to be displaced 
internally.103 
 Phase 5 (2001-2002) started with the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
which was followed by the US-escorted military invasion of 
Afghanistan and the fall of the Taliban regime. Around 1.5 
                                                 
97 Schmeidl, supra note 21, at 11. 
98 Id.; Timeline, supra note 83.  
99 The term “recyclers” is used to describe those Afghan refugees who are repatriated but 
later reenter Pakistan due to certain factors including lack of livelihood opportunities, 
volatile security situation, and insufficient absorptive or reintegration capacity in 
Afghanistan. According to the UNHCR Pakistan, in terms of repatriation cash grant, 
those individuals who have availed UNHCR’s repatriation assistance in the past and 
whose records are already enrolled in the IRIS data base. Voluntary Repatriation Update, 
infra note 192, at 1.  
100 Noor, supra note 47, at 62; Timeline, supra note 83. 
101 Schmeidl, supra note 84, at 5. 
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million Afghans left their homes,104 whereas 3,000-3,400 
civilian deaths were recorded as a result of the aerial 
bombardments during the first 20 weeks of the invasion.105 This 
era also experienced anti-Pashtun violence in western and 
northern Afghanistan.106According to the UNHCR SO 
Peshawar, due to the US-led military invasion, about 60,000 
new Afghan refugees arrived in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan 
and camped in nine new refugee villages.107 Moreover, this 
fresh wave of Afghan refugees contributed to the total figure of 
five  million Afghans who have crossed into Pakistan since 
1979.108 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION OF AFGHAN REFUGEES IN 
PAKISTAN 
A. The Response to Afghans in Pakistan 
The Durand Line divided the territory between the Indian subcontinent and 
Afghanistan; however, the strong religious, ethnic, and linguistic ties among 
the Pashtuns living on both sides of the border kept this border between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan as extremely porous.109 There is a long history of 
mobility between the Pashtuns of eastern Afghanistan and those living in the 
                                                 
104 Id. 
105 Id.; Marc W. Herold, US Bombing & Afghan Civilian Deaths - Official Neglect of 
‘Unworthy’ Bodies, 26 INT’L J. URB.&REG’L RES. 626 (2002), 
http://web.a.ebscohost.com.proxy.seattleu.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=c39ea907-
267c-46e4-9f6d-5c418deb64bf%40sessionmgr4010&vid=1&hid=4107. 
106 Schmeidl, supra note 84, at 5. 
107 Timeline, supra note 83. 
108 Id. 
109 “Pashtuns” or “Pakhtuns” is a dominant ethnic group in Afghanistan and one of the 
majors in Pakistan. They speak “Pashtu,” which is considered as one of the ancient 
languages in the region. Pashtu-speaking people residing primarily in the region that lies 
between the Hindu Kush in northeastern Afghanistan and the northern stretch of the 
Indus river in Pakistan. They are famous for their honor codes. During the Afghan war, 
Pashtuns became a major displaced population and more than 80 percent of the Afghan 
refugees living in Pakistan are Pashtuns. See Noor, supra note 47; see Hussain, supra 
note 62. 
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Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan.110 Various Pashtun tribes living 
on both sides of the border did not accept the Durand Line as an international 
border.111 In this context, those Afghans who entered the territory of Pakistan 
as a result of the first military coup in 1973, sought refuge in their relatives’ 
houses.112 
1. The Response of the Government of Pakistan 
In 1978, when the Afghan families initially started pouring in to Pakistan 
seeking refuge, the provincial governments and local administrations of 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan received them.113 As these two 
provinces of Pakistan share borders with Afghanistan, and the majority of the 
influx was also Pashtun, these two provinces became the main hosts of 
Afghan refugees.114 In April 1978, because of the military coup of Noor 
Muhammad Taraki, followed by the Soviet invasion in 1979, the exodus of 
Afghan families exceeded the handling capacity of the local administration 
and provincial governments.115 In this regard, the subject of the Afghan influx 
in Pakistan was assigned to the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions 
(SAFRON) in early 1980, upon the special direction of the President of 
Pakistan.116 
Assigning the special responsibility to the Ministry of SAFRON was a first 
definite step in structuring an administrative setup for humanitarian 
assistance for the Afghan influx in Pakistan. An office of the Chief 
Commissioner for Afghan Refugees (CCAR) was created at the federal level 
as an attached department of the Ministry of SAFRON. The CCAR office 
                                                 
110 Noor, supra note 47, at 62. 
111 Id. 
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113 Rizvi, supra note 32, at 45. 
114 See id. at 45-46. 
115 Noor, supra note 47, at 60. 
116 Chief Commissionerate for Afghan, MINISTRY STATES & FRONTIER REGIONS GOV’T 
PAKISTAN, (2012 – 13), 
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operates in four provinces of Pakistan, with four offices of Commissionerate 
for Afghan refugees (CAR).117 The CCAR is mandated to coordinate with 
federal and provincial governments, liaise with UN agencies and 
humanitarian organizations, engage in policy planning for Afghan refugees, 
give administrative support, and access provisions for Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan.118 Some of the core functions of the CCAR office are:119 
 Monitoring and evaluating programs being carried out by the 
international organizations and the Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) through periodic visits and inspections. 
 Maintaining and generating statistics with the collaboration of 
the UNHCR and coordinating relief work between the federal 
government and provincial governments. 
 Issuance of Non Objection Certificates (NOCs) to NGOs for 
operations and access to Refugee Villages or Camps (RVs) and 
urban settlements.  
 Provision of required data and assistance in operations to 
humanitarian actors and aid agencies. 
 Maintenance of close liaison with national and international aid-
giving agencies and documentation of the relief assistance. 
 Streamlining and standardizing procedures and methods of 
distribution of aid for Afghan Refugees down to the lowest level. 
 Maintaining warehouses funded by the UNHCR. 
 Coordinating repatriation of Afghan Refugees. 
 Raising awareness and ensuring induction of Afghan refugees in 
various assistance and empowerment programs. 
Since the creation of CAR offices, the government of Pakistan has brought 
changes to these offices as required in various situations. Initially, these 
offices played a vital role in assisting the aid agencies by providing human 
resources and making bulk distributions in the refugee camps.120 However, 
there has been a shift by widening the scope of operations in managing 




120 Rizvi, supra note 32, at 46. 
The Odyssey of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan 611 
VOLUME 15 • ISSUE 3 • 2017 
Afghan refugee camps and ensuring the involvement of Afghan refugees in 
implementing assistance programs. Along these lines, developments included 
the establishment of the Repatriation Cell in 1987 and the Community 
Development Unit (CDU).121 In February 2016, a Solutions Strategy Unit 
was established within the commisionerate office by merging the 
Repatriation and Education cells, with additional responsibilities assigned to 
this newly established unit.122 The Refugees Affected and Hosting Areas 
(RAHA) unit within the CAR office has also been established under one of 
the pillars of the Solution Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR).123 The 
RAHA program aims to balance the social, economic, and environmental 
consequences of the presence of Afghan refugees over the past 37 years in 
Pakistan.124 
2. Cooperation Agreement Between the UNHCR and the Government 
of Pakistan 
According to UN General Assembly Resolution 428 (V) of December14, 
1950, the High Commissioner for Refugees is mandated with providing 
international protection and seeking permanent solutions for refugees by 
assisting governments.125 Despite hosting millions of Afghan refugees over 
the course of 37 years, Pakistan still lacks a national legal framework to 
determine the status of refugees.126 In this regard, the government of Pakistan 
                                                 
121 Chief Commissionerate for Afghan, supra note 116. 
122 Id. 
123 The RAHA program is a main pillar of the recent and in-practice SSAR. As a 
signatory of SSAR, Pakistan is contributing to SSAR by implementing RAHA 
interventions. It is a joint program by the UNHCR and Government of Pakistan in 
Pakistan. The status of RAHA interventions is explained in detail in one of the main 
sections (Management of repatriation strategies). Chief Commissionerate for Afghan, 
supra note 116. 
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125 UNHCR, G.A. Res. 428 (V), at 4 (Dec. 14, 1954), 
http://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c39e1/statute-office-united-nations-high-
commissioner-refugees.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2017). 
126 See UNHCR in Pakistan, supra note 1.  
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and the UNHCR signed an Agreement of Cooperation in Islamabad on 
September 18, 1993.127 According to this agreement, Pakistan generally 
allows asylees to remain in Pakistan, based on the UNHCR decisions on 
refugee status determination for identification of durable solutions.128 The 
purpose of the agreement is to cooperate with the government of Pakistan 
within the mandate of the UNHCR. According to Article II of the agreement, 
the UNHCR shall open offices in the country and carry out its international 
protection and humanitarian assistance functions in favor of refugees and 
other persons of its concern in the host country.129 Furthermore, in accordance 
with the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN 
organizations, which was implemented in Pakistan under the Act of 1948, 
privileges and immunities were granted to the UNHCR under Article IX of 
the cooperation agreement.130 In addition, the terms, the conditions, and the 
scope of the authorities were brought into force, including procedures for 
terminating the agreement for both parties. 
B. The Legal Status of Afghan Refugees and Various Shifts in Their Status 
in Pakistan 
To date, Pakistan is a signatory of neither the Refugee Convention of 1951 
nor the additional protocols of 1967; however, the Afghan population that 
arrived in Pakistan post-1979 has de facto been considered prima facie 
refugees.131 Initially, when the exodus began, the status of Mohajerin was 
                                                 
127 See Cooperation Agreement Between the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (September. 1993) 
[hereinafter Cooperation Agreement] (on file with author). 
128 Asylum System in Pakistan, U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (Jan. 30, 
2017), http://unhcrpk.org/about/asylum-system-in-pakistan/. 
129 Cooperation Agreement, supra note 127, at 5.  
130 Id. at 10. 
131 Prima facie refugee status is one the mechanisms that is devised for responding to 
mass influxes and for group determination of refugee status. Prima facie status means the 
recognition by a State or the UNHCR on the basis of the readily apparent, objective 
circumstances in the country of origin giving rise to exodus. Its purpose is to ensure 
The Odyssey of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan 613 
VOLUME 15 • ISSUE 3 • 2017 
given to the Afghans, and Pakistan adopted an open-door policy.132 The 
hosting of Afghan refugees has never been viewed as a legal obligation, but 
as a humanitarian and religious duty.133 In this regard, the Afghans received 
the privilege of hospitality, one of the honor codes of Pashtun culture, 
because the concentration of Afghan refugees was in the provinces of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan of Pakistan.134 
Pakistan lacks established procedures to determine the refugee status in its 
territory because of the absence of a legal instrument at the national level to 
protect refugees.135 However, the 1946 Foreigner’s Act of Pakistan presents 
a legal framework for its immigration policy.136According to the Act, those 
who want to enter into the territory of Pakistan must have a valid travel 
document and a visa.137 The response of Pakistan to Afghan refugees has been 
largely consistent with norms in refugee law since the exodus started in 1979; 
however, even after the provision of prima facie status, certain Afghans still 
remain under the scope of the Foreigner’s Act.138 
                                                 
admission to safety, protection from refoulment, and basic humanitarian treatment to 
those who are in need. Asylum System in Pakistan, supra note 128. 
132 Mohajerin is the plural of Mohajer, which is an Arabic word, and means an immigrant. 
The concept of Mohajerin in the case of Afghan refugees in Pakistan was referred to the 
Hijrat (Migration) of The Holy Prophet Muhammad (SAW) from Mecca to Madina, 
where he and his companions were warmly welcomed by the inhabitants of Madina. In 
this context, the influx of Afghan refugees was also viewed as a religious responsibility 
in Pakistan. David Turton & Peter Marsden, Taking Refugees for a Ride. The Politics of 
Refugee Return to Afghanistan, AFGHANISTAN RES. & EVALUATION UNIT 10 (2002), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/47c3f3cb1a.html. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 14. 
135 Asylum System in Pakistan, supra note 128. 
136 The Foreigner’s Act of Pakistan of 1946 defines “foreigner” and the status of a 
foreigner in Pakistan. The Act provides guidance to the Government of Pakistan to 
exercise certain powers with respect of foreigners. Pakistan: Foreigners Act, 1946, 
REFWORLD (Apr. 7, 2017), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4f314.html. 
137 Afghans in Pakistan: Broadening the Focus, AFGHANISTAN RES. & EVALUATION 
UNIT 7 (2006), http://www.refworld.org/docid/47c3f3c31a.html. 
138 Id. at 7. 
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The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989 decreased 
Western donors’ interest in Afghan refugees in Pakistan, bringing about a 
policy shift in which the government of Pakistan granted refugee status on a 
prima facie basis.139 In the 1980s, identity or ration passes had been issued to 
Afghan families.140 These passes entitled the Afghan families to get 
assistance, including food; however, the passes did not provide legal 
protection in the form of legal status and were used merely for getting 
assistance.141 The withdrawal of Soviet troops in February 1989 created the 
grounds for repatriation.142 At that time, an assisted repatriation program was 
started by the encashment of ration passes in 1992.143 The process of 
encashment of ration passes was practiced until 1995, and in the same year, 
the ration passes were stopped, and the refugees were no longer entitled to 
get assistance.144 This change in policy created complications to the return 
process and left the Afghan families in a miserable and vulnerable situation; 
later on, which added more to the identity crises of Afghans in Pakistan. 
In 1995, humanitarian assistance decreased when ration cards ceased to be 
effective in providing rations.145 This created a perplexing situation regarding 
the status of Afghans in Pakistan. This scenario fashioned an ambiguous 
situation not only for the Afghan families in Pakistan, but also for the 
humanitarian actors. In order to contextualize the whole situation, the 
Secretary of the then Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas and States and 
Frontier Regions Division (now Ministry of SAFRON) issued a letter in July 
1997 to the Ministry of Interior regarding the status of Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan, stating, 
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During the temporary stay of the Afghan Refugees in Pakistan all 
laws applicable to the local citizens shall apply to the Afghan 
Refugees. However, as the Government of Pakistan has provided 
refuge to the Afghan refugees on humanitarian grounds, the 
provisions of the Foreigners Registration Act and other such rules 
pertaining to foreigners residing in Pakistan do not apply to the 
Afghan refugees. 
All along their stay, the Afghan Refugees have never been confined 
to the camps. The above is also necessitated by the fact that almost 
all the food and other assistance previously provided by the 
international agencies, has been discontinued w.e.f. October 1995. 
The Afghan Refugees have, therefore, to earn their livelihood 
outside the camps in Pakistan to support themselves as well as their 
families. The movement/presence of Afghan refugees outside the 
refugee camps is, therefore, legitimate.146 
While the above-mentioned letter was a clear statement by the government 
of Pakistan, it also clarified the lack of humanitarian assistance and interest 
from the West. The statement by the government of Pakistan had given 
freedom of movement, but, on the other hand, the movement of Afghan 
refugees from camps to urban settlements created a huge issue in tracing 
records; later, it became a vital contributor in making the Afghan caseload a 
protracted refugee case.147 
 
1. Era of Ambiguous Identity or Identity Crises 
The urbanization of Afghan refugees created confusion beginning in the 
mid 1990’s, when the urbanization of Afghan families was legitimized, until 
the first ever census of Afghan families in Pakistan in 2005.148 Despite the 
legalization of the stay of Afghan families in urban settlements, as a result of 
                                                 
146The Secretary Ministry of Interior, Status of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, GOV’T 
PAKISTAN (July 1997) (on file with author). 
147 See Working Paper for the Meeting on Urban Refugees Management Policy 19-11-
2014, GOV’T PAKISTAN, STATES & FRONTIER REGIONS DIVISION (Nov. 19, 2014) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter Working Paper].  
148 Afghans in Pakistan: Broadening the Focus, supra note 137, at 3. 
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the discontinuation of the aid programs and the exemption from the 
Foreigners Act of Pakistan, the Afghans faced exploitation in the urban 
settlements.149 During this particular phase, the UNHCR’s stance on the 
provision of protection to Afghans in urban areas was unclear.150 One of the 
vital factors in this reluctance was the absence of statistics on Afghans living 
in the urban settlements.151 They were exposed and subjected to the 
Foreigners Act of 1946.152 During this time, when the Afghans living in 
Pakistan were struggling with the crises related to their ambiguous status, 
Pakistan was receiving a new wave of Afghans as a result of the fall of the 
northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan in 1999, during the Taliban 
regime.153 Furthermore, the influx of Afghan families increased as result of 
one of the worst droughts in Afghanistan’s history.154 As a result of this new 
wave, the term economic migrant was introduced. Additionally, the 
government of Pakistan had halted the prima facie refugee status for the new 
influx of refugees.155 The influx of Afghans in the late 1990s and in 2000 
complicated the ambiguous status of those who were already staying in 
Pakistan. On the other hand, the government of Pakistan clearly expressed 
asylum fatigue. 
In 2001, after the US-led military invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan 
became a hub of Afghans with different status and labels, based on their 
arrival timeframes in Pakistan.156 These labels included mohajireen, refugees 
with prima facie status, economic migrants, illegal immigrants, and migrant 
workers.157 However, it was difficult to differentiate these various categories 
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of Afghan families in Pakistan and to determine the status and level of 
persecution. 
2. Registration of Afghans in Pakistan 
The scenario discussed regarding ambiguous identity in the section “Status 
of Afghans in Pakistan” had arisen because of the absence of accurate data 
on Afghan families living in Pakistan.158 Admittedly, it was a difficult task to 
collect data on Afghans, given that the back-and-forth movements between 
the countries of asylum and origin were a common practice and were 
recorded on a daily basis.159 However, the fact that there was a war going on 
in a neighboring country with which Pakistan shares a  1200-mile 
(approximately) long porous border raised serious concerns over Pakistan’s 
internal security.160 On December 17, 2004, the government of Pakistan and 
the UNHCR signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) UNHCR to 
organize a census and register the Afghans living in Pakistan.161 In order to 
operationalize the MoU, the government of Pakistan was represented by the 
Ministry of SAFRON and the Ministry of Interior, whereas the UNHCR was 
represented by the UNHCR representation in Pakistan.162 The first ever 
census of Afghans living in Pakistan was conducted in February and March 
of 2005, and had two objectives: (1) To issue basic identity documentation in 
the form of a Proof of Registration (PoR) to each individual of the target 
population over five years of age who was temporarily living in Pakistan, and 
(2): To supplement ongoing data collection and analysis required for the 
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further developments of arrangements for the management of Afghan citizens 
temporarily living in Pakistan.163 
Following a census, the registration of Afghans began in 2006.164 
According to the MoU, the UNHCR would ensure funds of $5.995 million 
for the registration of Afghans in Pakistan.165 The National Authority for Data 
and Registration (NADRA) was assigned to issue computerized identity 
documents capable of storing electronic data.166 The Government of Pakistan 
and UNHCR mutually agreed that the target of the registration would be 
Afghan citizens who entered Pakistan or were born in Pakistan after 
December 1, 1979.167 Furthermore, the scope of the registration process was 
extended to Azad Jammu& Kashmir, and Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas (FATA).168 The registration process was planned in two phases: (1) 
Analyzing data collected from the census and other relevant sources required 
for the registration process in order to design the technical and financial 
aspects of the planning and implementation of the registration exercise for all 
Afghan citizens previously covered in the census; and (2) registration and 
issuance of Proof of Registration (PoR) to each individual over five years of 
age of the target population.169 
Initially, the parties agreed upon a three-year validity period for the PoR 
cards, which was from 2006 to 2009, and decided that extensions would be 
based upon the mutual agreement of signatories of the Tripartite 
agreement.170 After the expiry of PoR cards in 2009 and 2012, new cards 
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were issued in 2010 and 2014, respectively.171 In July 2013, the Federal 
Cabinet of Pakistan adopted a National Policy on Management and 
Repatriation of Afghan Refugees and extended the validity of PoR cards and 
the Tripartite Agreement on Voluntary Repatriation, until December 31, 
2015.172 In this context, a nationwide PoR card renewal exercise was 
completed in February 2015 with the support of the UNHCR.173 A total of 
1,208,632 PoR cardholders, 93 percent of the total registered Afghan refugee 
population in Pakistan, were issued new cards that were valid until December 
31, 2015.174 Besides that, as of August 2015, six Proof of Registration Card 
Modification (PCM) centers registered some 62,000 births of children to 
Afghan refugees.175 A special helpline, mass information campaigns, and 
SMS services were also provided in support of the renewal process.176 After 
the expiry of PoR cards in December 2015, the Ministry of SAFRON 
extended the validity of the existing PoR cards thrice in the year 2016.177 The 
current PoR cards are valid until December 31, 2017, as a result of a 
notification issued on February 22, 2017, by the Ministry of SAFRON.178 The 
extension will be reviewed in the final quarter of 2017 for continuation of the 
legal stay of Afghan refugees and will be based on the mutual agreement of 
the signatories’ of Tripartite agreement.179 
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It is important to know about some of the entitlements of a PoR card and 
the legal status of the PoR card bearers, which are180 
 The PoR card is an identity document and entitles the cardholder 
to legally remain in Pakistan until the expiry of the card. The 
card is valid throughout Pakistan. 
 Every registered Afghan must carry the new PoR card and 
present it to law enforcement agencies on demand. 
 PoR cardholders have the right to reside in Pakistan and cannot 
be arrested under the 1946 Foreigners Act. However, the PoR 
card does not give immunity from criminal prosecution if bearers 
are involved in criminal activities or breach any other Pakistan’s 
law. 
 The PoR card is not a travel document and does not allow its 
holder to cross international borders, including between Pakistan 
and Afghanistan. 
The government of Pakistan and the UNHCR agreed that the PoR card 
would carry only personal biographical data. The card would also legitimize 
the temporary stay of the cardholder as Afghan citizen in Pakistan.181 
The issuance of PoR cards was vital not only for having statistical records 
regarding Afghan families in Pakistan but also for putting the legal presence 
of these families in writing. With these developments, a few missing links 
were also observed in some key areas regarding entitlements attached to PoR 
cards. During the announcement regarding urbanization of Afghan refugees 
in July 1997, it was quite clear that Afghan refugees in Pakistan would not 
be confined to camps and would be allowed to earn livelihoods.182 However, 
                                                 
180 Frequently Asked Questions, Services Available at the Proof of Registration Card 
Medication (PCM) Centres, U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES 1-3, 
http://unhcrpk.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/FAQs-on-PCM-Centre-Services-
English.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2017).  
181 Frequently Asked Questions, Services Available at the Proof of Registration Card 
Medication (PCM) Centres, U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (Last visited 
7/7/17) http://unhcrpk.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/FAQs-on-PCM-Centre-Services-
English.pdf 
182 The Secretary Ministry of Interior, supra note 146. 
The Odyssey of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan 621 
VOLUME 15 • ISSUE 3 • 2017 
Clause 4, Section 3 of the MoU clearly stated that the PoR card does not grant 
a right to work or work authorization in Pakistan.183 This statement meant 
that those Afghan refugees who were living legally in Pakistan were not 
allowed to work. The ad hoc nature of the various announcements, 
notifications, and policies kept the Afghan refugees in Pakistan in a state of 
continuous uncertainty. However, with the ongoing advocacy by 
humanitarian organizations and the UNHCR, various developments have 
been observed regarding entitlements of PoR cards in Pakistan. In this regard, 
after the extension of PoR cards until December 2015, the Ministry of 
SAFRON allowed PoR cardholders to use their cards to open bank accounts, 
receive driving licenses, and obtain SIM cards.184 This step from the 
government of Pakistan received a loud applause from humanitarian actors 
including UN agencies as well. 
C. Durable Solutions and Its Status in Pakistan 
The UNHCR is mandated to provide international protection.185 The 
ultimate aim of refugee protection is to secure permanent solutions for 
refugees. Finding durable solutions has always been a difficult task in 
protracted refugee situations and particularly in a case where the back-and-
forth movement between countries of asylum and origin is a common 
practice.186 The majority of the current Afghan refugee population was born 
in Pakistan and has never experienced a life in Afghanistan.187 Article 1 of 
the UNHCR Statute outlines durable solutions for refugees under two distinct 
captions, which are voluntary repatriation and assimilation into new national 
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communities.188 Assimilation into new national communities can take two 
forms: (1) local integration in the country of first asylum, or (2) resettlement 
in a third country.189 
Local integration is the integration of refugees in the country of first 
asylum or principal state of asylum.190  Pakistan is a signatory to neither the 
Refugee Convention of 1951 nor any other refugee-related instrument 
internationally. In this regard, there are no prospects of local integration for 
Afghans in Pakistan. On the other hand, “resettlement is not a right and there 
is no obligation on states to accept refugees for resettlement.”191 It is the 
equitable sharing of responsibilities to settle the refugees permanently in a 
third country. Additionally, only extremely vulnerable refugees are eligible 
for resettlement, particularly those who are unable to repatriate, stay 
temporarily, or integrate in the country of first asylum.192 
The success of resettlement cases is not very high. In June 2015, the 
UNHCR estimated that, globally, almost 1.15 million refugees are in need of 
resettlement based on their extreme vulnerabilities; however, only 27 
countries are willing to resettle refugees.193 In addition, 86 percent of the total 
resettled refugees are residing in developing countries, which evidence the 
unwillingness of developed countries to share and bear the responsibility of 
integrating refugees in their societies.194According to updates issued by the 
                                                 
188 UNHCR, supra note 125, at 6. 
189 Id. at 8. 
190 UNCHR and International Protection: A Protection Induction Programme, U.N. HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES 77 (June 30, 2006), http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/publications/legal/44b4bbcd2/unhcr-international-protection-protection-induction-
programme.html. 
191 Frequently Asked Questions about Resettlement, U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR 
REFUGEES 2 (Apr. 2012) (on file with author). 
192 Id. at 1. 
193 Global Refugee Crisis – by the Numbers, AMNESTY INT’L (Oct. 12, 2015), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/10/global-refugee-crisis-by-the-numbers/. 
194 Id. 
The Odyssey of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan 623 
VOLUME 15 • ISSUE 3 • 2017 
UNHCR Pakistan, the organization had submitted approximately 2,000 
resettlement cases to third or resettlement countries in 2015.195 
In the legal context of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, voluntary repatriation 
has always been viewed as a possible and agreeable solution not only by the 
government of Pakistan, but by humanitarian actors including the UN 
agencies. 
D. Voluntary Repatriation Program 
The UNHCR considered repatriation of Afghan refugees as a preferred 
durable solution in the legal context of Pakistan.196 However, the 
sustainability of this solution, in terms of reintegrating returnees in 
Afghanistan, presents a challenge for the UNHCR and the governments of 
both countries (Afghanistan and Pakistan), and has also raised questions over 
the credibility and durability of voluntary repatriation. The UNHCR 
facilitates voluntary repatriation in Pakistan as part of its mandate.197 The 
voluntary repatriation program of Pakistan, which started in 1992, is the 
world’s largest UNHCR repatriation program.198 The program had stopped in 
1999 because of funding constraints; however, it resumed in 2000 and still 
operates.199 The UNHCR’s voluntary repatriation program was suspended 
from December 1, 2016 to February 28, 2017 for winter break.200 This 
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suspension was then extended until March 31, 2017, because of the closure 
of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The UNHCR has recently 
announced to resume its repatriation program beginning April 3, 2017.Apart 
from the winter break, lack of funding was the main factor in the suspension 
of the repatriation program.201 The UNHCR Pakistan facilitates the voluntary 
repatriation program along with relevant government departments, including 
the Commisionerate Afghan Refugees and humanitarian organizations.202 
The voluntary repatriation program of Afghan refugees in Pakistan can be 
divided into two phases: (1) Pre-9/11, and (2) Post-9/11. 
The Pre-9/11 phase was driven by the Soviets’ withdrawal.203 However, 
decreased funding for Afghan refugees in Pakistan was also a compelling 
factor in the start of the repatriation program in 1992.204 The Pre-9/11 
program was not properly structured to link the assistance (reintegration 
grant) with actual repatriation.205 The Post-9/11 program was a comparatively 
structured program and was based upon the lessons learned from the Pre-9/11 
program.206 However, it is extremely challenging for  the host country and 
humanitarian organizations to facilitate, maintain, and sustain the pace of 
repatriation program in a situation where back-and-forth movements of 
refugees is a common practice because of the lack of reintegration drivers in 
the country of origin.207 
1. Pre-9/11 
In February 1989, with the withdrawal of the Soviets, Mujahideen took 
charge by dethroning the PDPA’s government led by Najib.208 This scenario 
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laid the groundwork to plan a massive repatriation program.209 In this regard, 
the UNHCR launched an assisted voluntary repatriation program.210 In order 
to be part of this program, the Afghan refugees had to show willingness to 
repatriate by cancelling their passes to get a grant of $100 and 300 kg of wheat 
grains as a repatriation package.211 The program also had the implicit 
outcome of encashment of ration passes.212 Withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan was not the only driver of the repatriation program; additionally, 
a deficit of donor interest was also a compelling factor during the 1990s.213 
The 1990s repatriation program of the UNHCR incentivized the de-
registration of Afghan families in the assistance books of aid agencies rather 
than to support actual return.214 In short, it was less repatriation and more of 
a de-registration process.215 
The families who had lost almost everything in the Soviet transition 
encashed their ration passes because they were in need of funds, particularly 
in a situation where donor fatigue had also been expressed in the provision of 
assistance. Repatriation was at its peak because of the fall of Najib’s 
government and the rise of the Mujahideen regime in Afghanistan; however, 
it is also worth mentioning that the number of de-registered refugees was 
greater than the actual number of repatriated refugees.216 According to the 
government of Pakistan, between July 1990 and early 1994, only one-third of 
those refugees who showed willingness and encashed their ration passes were 
actually repatriated, whereas the rest of them remained in Pakistan.217 
Encashment of ration passes was practiced until 1995, and in the same year, 
the ration passes were stopped and no longer allowed holders to receive 
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assistance from aid agencies; however, repatriation was an ongoing process 
until 1999.218 
The era between 1995 and 2000 was a perplexing time period not only for 
Afghan refugees in terms of their status, assistance, and repatriation, but also 
for the humanitarian actors and the government of Pakistan in terms of 
funding insufficiency. Additionally, the uproar inside Afghanistan was also 
at its peak and was directly linked to the influx in Pakistan, when the Taliban 
took charge over Herat in 1995, Kabul in 1996, Mazar-e-Sharif in 1998, and 
Taloqan in September 2000, which was directly linked to the influx in 
Pakistan.219 Besides that, the war-affected country was brutally hit by terrible 
drought, which not only raised the number of recyclers (who re-entered the 
country of asylum after repatriation) in Pakistan, but also increased internal 
displacement in 2000.220 During this time period, on one hand, Afghan 
refugees were compelled to practice back-and-forth movements because of 
the fight between various factions of Mujahideen and power politics in 
Afghanistan; on the other hand, humanitarian actors were also muddled 
because of the unclear status of Afghans in Pakistan and funding 
insufficiency.221 
2. Post-9/11 
The voluntary repatriation program of the UNHCR was suspended in 1999 
due to funding constraints.222 However, even when it resumed in 2000, the 
Afghan refugees did not view it as one of the preferred durable solutions, due 
to the volatile security situation and worst ever drought in Afghanistan.223 
Furthermore, in the wake of 9/11, the US-escorted military invasion created 
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an unpredictable security situation in Afghanistan.224 In 2001, according to 
the UNHCR SO Peshawar, this scenario made Khyber Pakhtunkhwa the host 
of 60,000 newly arrived refugees, which contributed to the total figure of five 
million Afghan refugees in Pakistan.225 
In December 2001, the transitional government in Afghanistan created 
hopes for a secure and conducive environment for repatriation to 
Afghanistan.226 Later, in June 2002, as a result of the Loya Jirga (grand 
assembly), the appointment of Hamid Karzai as interim president was one of 
the decisive moments for Afghan refugees to rethink of repatriation as a 
durable solution.227 These measures acted as a pull factor in Afghanistan and 
created grounds for a voluntary repatriation program in Pakistan.228 In 
September 2002, the UNHCR claimed the single largest assisted repatriation 
since 1972, which included almost 1.63 million persons.229 This time, the 
UNHCR approached the challenge with a well-designed, systematic, and 
more structured repatriation program. 
In 2002, the UNHCR established Voluntary Repatriation Centers (VRCs) 
in Pakistan to facilitate the return process and to ensure that repatriation was 
voluntary, dignified, and in accordance with international standards.230 
Initially, it was planned that seven voluntary repatriation centers would be 
established.231 Being a leading refugee-hosting province, two VRCs were 
established in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa at Peshawar and 
Timergara in the Lower Dir district, while one was established in Quetta at 
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Baleli (Balochistan).232 However, later on, the VRC at Timergara was closed 
because of limited use by refugees, and there were two VRCs operating in 
Pakistan until August 2016. Recently, in September 2016, another VRC was 
established at Azakhel (District Nowshera) to respond to the increased 
number of refuges repatriating from Pakistan, the second VRC in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa province and third in the country.233 
VRCs in Pakistan are facilitating refugees from camps as well as from 
urban settlements.234 The procedure of de-registration from the NADRA 
database and receipt of Voluntary Repatriation Form (VRF) is a step-by-step 
process that was clearly explained by the UNHCR, humanitarian 
organizations, and CAR staff through the distribution of brochures and 
leaflets in the native languages of Afghan refugees.235 Families who wish to 
repatriate are de-registered at VRCs, where they give up their PoR cards and 
receive a VRF.236 The VRF is a proof of repatriation kept by the refugees, 
which also enables them to receive a cash reintegration grant for returnees 
from the UNHCR at encashment centers (ECs) in Afghanistan.237 
Presently, there are three ECs in Afghanistan, where returnees receive 
reintegration grants upon arrival.238 Initially, the reintegration grant was $100 
per person, but was later increased to $150 in March 2011 and then to $200 
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in January 2014.239 In June 2016, the reintegration grant was increased to 
$350 along with a transportation allowance of $30-70 per family member.240 
The transportation allowance depends upon the distance between the 
residential area in Pakistan and the final destination in Afghanistan.241 During 
the months of September, October, and November of 2016, the UNHCR 
spent over $130 million in terms of reintegration cash grant.242 
 Recently, on the eve of resuming its repatriation program, the UNHCR has 
announced to decrease the individual reintegration grant from approximately 
$400 to $200.243 Apart from funding constraints, human rights organizations 
critiqued the UNHCR regarding using reintegration grant as a tool for 
promoting voluntary repatriation, which probably resulted in the decrease of 
reintegration grant. In contrast, the UNHCR refutes the claim of the 
promotion of repatriation through the raise in reintegration grant.244 However, 
it will be worth watching the pace and numbers of repatriation in 2017 and 
beyond with the decreased amount of grant. 
3. Tripartite Agreement 
The repatriation of Afghan refugees is guided by the principle of 
voluntarism, as embedded in the Tripartite Agreement, initially signed 
between the Government of Pakistan, the Government of Afghanistan, and 
the UNHCR in 2003 at Brussels.245 After being extended several times, the 
                                                 
239 Working Paper, supra note 147, at 2. 
240 UNHCR, supra note 125, at 1. 
241 Id. 
242 Suspension of UNHCR’s Voluntary Repatriation Program, Top Lines, U.N. HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES 1 (on file with author). 
243 UNHCR, supra note 125, at 1 
244 Id. 
245 Agreement Between the Government of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, The Transitional 
Islamic State of Afghanistan and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
Governing the Repatriation of Afghan Citizens Living in Pakistan, U.N. HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES3 (2003), http://www.unhcr.org/3f5d97524.pdf 
[hereinafter Agreement Between]. 
630 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
agreement was recently extended until December 31, 2017.246 In the 
agreement, the parties recognized voluntary repatriation as a preferred 
durable solution; however, the return should be dignified and framed in the 
context of the security situation in Afghanistan.247 
The agreement focused on establishing a framework to cooperate, plan, 
and implement coordinated programs for voluntary repatriation of Afghan 
citizens in Pakistan with the support of the international community.248 The 
agreement has 28 articles.249 Article 1 of the agreement established a 
“Tripartite Commission” among signatories of the agreement.250 The 
Tripartite Commission Agreement regulates the repatriation of registered 
Afghan citizens in Pakistan.251 The agreement thoroughly explained the role 
and nature of the commission. Article 4 of the commission gives explanation 
about meetings of the commission.252 The parties agreed that members of the 
commission would meet quarterly.253 
In this regard, the commission met twice in 2015. The 25th Tripartite 
Commission meeting was held on March 11, 2015, at Islamabad, and the 26th 
Commission meeting was organized on August 22, 2015, at Kabul.254 At the 
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25th Tripartite Commission meeting, it was noted that both governments 
agreed to develop mutually reinforcing plans for the return and reintegration 
in Afghanistan, as well as management of Afghan refugees in Pakistan 
beyond 2015.255 At the 26th Commission, among the topics emphasized were 
the need for regular exchange of information between governments, cross-
border cooperation on livelihood interventions, and prioritization of returnees 
by the Government of Afghanistan under its new comprehensive voluntary 
repatriation and reintegration plan.256 The participants also focused on a 
comprehensive repatriation package such as an Enhanced Voluntary Return 
and Reintegration Package (EVRP), to ensure sustainable reintegration of 
returnees in Afghanistan.257 Furthermore, the Minister of SAFRON 
emphasized continued investment in RAHA (Refugee Affected and Hosting 
Area Program) projects which will enable Pakistan to host Afghan refugees 
by preserving asylum space in the country.258 On July 19, 2016, the 
Commission meeting was held at Bhurban, Pakistan.259 The meeting 
concluded with the parties reiterating their commitment of the safe, dignified, 
and voluntary repatriation as the best solution to end the protracted refugee 
situation in Pakistan.260 Pakistan further urged the importance of immediate, 
concrete, and tangible reintegration measures in Afghanistan for the expected 
high returns due to the enhanced repatriation grant.261 Additionally, the 
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parties reaffirmed their commitment to uphold the letter and spirit of the 
SSAR, as a regional framework and platform for coordinated actions to 
identify and implement lasting solutions for Afghan refugees.262 Besides that, 
the need for international solidarity, equitable responsibility sharing, 
development investment, and active engagement was also focused on, to end 
the chapter of Afghan refugees in Pakistan.263 
 The 28th Tripartite Commission meeting was held in Islamabad, Pakistan 
on February 15, 2017.264 All parties of the commission welcomed the new 
national policy of the Government of Pakistan regarding management of the 
Afghan refugees and Afghan nationals living in Pakistan.265 The policy 
includes (1) extension of Proof of Registration (PoR) cards and the Tripartite 
Agreement until December 31, 2017; (2) approval of a visa regime for 
different categories of Afghan refugees including students, 
businessmen/traders, skilled/unskilled laborers, intermarriages, and 
healthcare; (3) commitment to adoption of a national refugee law, including 
agreement to document the undocumented Afghan refugees; and (4) 
improvement in border management.266 All the parties reaffirmed their 
commitment to uphold the principle of voluntarism in repatriation under the 
Tripartite Agreement as well as to pursue and implement lasting solutions for 
Afghan refugees within the regional framework of SSAR.267 The participants 
agreed that the Afghanistan government would host the 29th Tripartite 
Commission meeting during the year 2017.268 
 The agreement is a complete document that not only upholds the 
commitment of its signatories regarding dignified voluntary repatriation as a 
preferred durable solution, but also defines the supervisory role of the 
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UNHCR, including movement and security of the UNHCR staff.269 The 
document covers almost all the aspects involved in the repatriation of 
registered Afghan citizens in Pakistan. The agreement not only covers the 
international access to Afghan citizens before and after repatriation but also 
focuses on the preservation of family unity (Article 16), special measures for 
vulnerable groups (Article 17), and immigration, customs, and health 
formalities (Article 19).270 However, the effectiveness of this agreement is 
directly contingent upon the commitment, seriousness, and dedication of both 
governments towards making extraordinary efforts for the dignified, 
voluntary return and sustainable reintegration in Afghanistan. 
4. Voluntary Repatriation Process and Facilitation at VRCs 
The UNHCR assists voluntary repatriation in three VRCs (Voluntary 
Repatriation Centers) in Pakistan, and offers this assistance with relevant 
government authorities and implementing partners including CAR, NADRA, 
Project Directorate Health (PDH), and the Ministry of Refugees and 
Repatriation (MoRR).271 VRC Chamkani at Peshawar has the ability to 
process approximately 1,800 refugees per day, and all the VRCs deal with 
only registered Afghan refugees in Pakistan.272 
VRCs have been equipped with the latest biometric technology.273 It has 
been observed that the repatriation process has been equipped with passage 
of time, and new technologies were introduced in the UNHCR’s VRCs to 
cover the gaps in the repatriation process. In 2002, when repatriation was at 
its peak, the issue of recyclers emerged as a challenge for the UNHCR. Those 
families that had repatriated reentered in Pakistan and invoked the same 
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process to re-earn the cash grant.274 As of 2002, there was no record of 
Afghan families in the NADRA database.275 In this situation, an Iris 
recognition test was introduced to ensure the secure receipt of cash grants, as 
well as to prevent recycling.276 The technology enabled the UNHCR to trace 
the recyclers. It was vital to maintain authenticity and accuracy in records of 
repatriated families to make it more transparent, as well as accessible for the 
authorities involved in the process. Those registered Afghan refugees who 
underwent the Iris checks are now unable to get cash grants, even after getting 
the PoR cards in 2006.277 The following are the various facilitation steps to 
process Afghan refugees for voluntary repatriation at VRCs:278 
 
 Verification: To check authenticity of PoR cards, verify family 
composition, ensure a free and informed decision to return, and 
check vulnerability of persons requiring special attention; 
i. De-registration—individual refugee is checked against 
the Afghan Citizen Registration (ACR) biometric database 
and is de-registered. 
ii. Iris Recognition Test ensures individuals receive 
repatriation assistance once; prevents re-cycling. 
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 Protection Desk: Ensure protective presence in voluntary 
repatriation centers to Persons of Concern (POC),) with particular 
focus on Persons with Specific Needs (PSNs). 
 Health & Sanitation Facilities: For minor emergencies an 
ambulance service is available. In addition, safe drinking water 
and toilet facilities have been provided at the centers, including 
toilets for PSNs. 
 Validation:VRFs are validated and assigned consecutive 
numbers to enable individuals to receive cash grants at the 
Encashment Centers (ECs) in Afghanistan. 
 Luggage Verification: Luggage is checked to ensure 
compliance. 
 Transport: Self-organized transport both in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. 
 Cash Grant: Each returnee receives a reintegration grant at the 
ECs upon arrival in Afghanistan. 
 
To ensure the safe and dignified return of Afghan refugees, implementing 
and operational partners of the UNHCR are patrolling the major return routes. 
The responsible staff is in continuous contact with law enforcement agencies 
and returnees to address any unpleasant incidents during the return. 
5. Urbanization of Afghan Refugees as a Missing Link 
In the early years, Afghan refugees were kept in camps across the 
country.279 However, the discontinuation of food assistance inside the camps 
during 1995 led the Pakistani government to implement a policy shift in July 
1997.280 The Secretary of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas and States and 
Frontier Regions Division issued a notification regarding the status of Afghan 
families living in Pakistan.281 The notification clearly justified the movement 
of Afghan refugees into urban settlements and lifted the restrictions on 
staying within the refugee camps. While, Afghan families that started work 
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to earn bread faced discriminative treatment in the urban communities, the 
issue was addressed after being brought up by the UNHCR and humanitarian 
actors. 
In the context of urbanization policy, almost 70 percent of the PoR 
cardholders are currently living outside the camps, mostly as urban 
refugees.282 The movement of refugees in the 1990s from camps to urban 
communities created huge issues in tracing the records and later became a 
vital contributor in making the Afghan case a protracted refugee case.283 
During the 1990s, along with the integration in urban settlements, repatriation 
was an ongoing process, whereby the UNHCR and the World Food Program 
(WFP) shrank their support and aid programs for refugee camps.284 Because 
of the urbanization policy, the number of refugees in camps decreased, and 
the burden was reduced on aid agencies.285 On the other hand, a large number 
of legal and administrative issues arose.286 
The move to urban settlements simply changed the title of Afghans from 
camp refugees to urban refugees and became a shift in state, not in status. 
Furthermore, the reduced number of refugees in camps, as a result of 
urbanization of refugees in the 1990s, had created an impression of a high 
number of repatriated refugees; however, an increased number of refugees in 
urban settlements had never been monitored due to the lack of proper 
communication channels.287 There is still a visible disconnect between the 
Provincial Commissionerates and the urban refugees, given that the 
Provincial Commissionerates are designed and trained for camp 
management.288 There is lack of a policy or any formal mechanism to 
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effectively manage urban refugees.289 Due to urbanization, the repatriation 
trend has dropped down and hosting fatigue between host communities has 
also increased.290 
6. Repatriation trend in Pakistan 
The post-9/11 phase of voluntary repatriation was methodically 
approached by the UNHCR; however, the repatriation program was 
extensively affected by the unstable security situation in Afghanistan.291 
According to the UNHCR, 4,301,171 refugees had been repatriated from 
Pakistan from 2002 until November 30, 2016, with the UNHCR’s 
assistance.292 Despite the stable government between 2002 and 2015 and a 
comparatively better security situation, Afghan refugees showed reluctance 
to repatriation in 2006, 2009, and onwards due to lack of economic resources 
and livelihood opportunities in Afghanistan.293 According to the UNHCR, in 
2016, 38 percent of the repatriating families preferred to remain in Pakistan 
due to secure income in Pakistan; whereas 28 percent disclosed the fact of 
lack of employment opportunities in Afghanistan during repatriation.294 Lack 
of secure income and livelihood opportunities are the major constraints in 
voluntary repatriation.295 Apart from cash grants provided at ECs, there is no 
other considerable assistance provided to returnees in Afghanistan.296 The 
UNHCR facilitates returnees via shelter projects, and this facilitation occurs 
on an as-needed basis.297 However, the shelter project covers those vulnerable 
returnees who have their own land in their places of origin; whereas, for the 
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majority of returnees, land is another gargantuan issue.298 The Ministry of 
Refugees and Repatriations (MoRR) is the guardian for Land Allocation 
Schemes (LAS) in Afghanistan.299 Huge levels of corruption and thousands 
of pending applications in LAS submerged the hopes of returnees for a 
sustainable reintegration in Afghanistan.300 Similarly, in Afghanistan, the 
policy of provision of assistance by the UNHCR and MoRR to only those 
returnees who have VRF put the unregistered returnees in a nowhere 
situation.301 These policies not only create barriers for reintegration of 
returnees in Afghanistan but also compel the undocumented returnees to 
recycle.302 
Several times the UNHCR and humanitarian organizations in Pakistan have 
sought to speed up and strengthen repatriation; however, the temporary 
nature of those efforts was unable to generate a constant positive impact in 
repatriation. In 2012, the UNHCR Pakistan bore the transportation cost of 
returnees, which raised the graph of repatriation. However, after ending the 
transportation allowance on December 31, 2012, a clear depression has been 
observed in repatriation in the following years. Similarly, the situation 
generated in the wake of the terrorist attack on the Army Public School (APS) 
in Peshawar on December 16, 2014, created a push factor for Afghan 
refugees, particularly in urban settlements.303 The law enforcement agencies 
started large-scale arrests, deportations, and harassment of Afghan refugees, 
which not only refouled, but also compelled huge numbers of Afghan 
families to opt for repatriation.304 The UNHCR responded well and controlled 
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the situation with time by doing advocacy at different levels; however, the 
role of the UNHCR seems limited in such situations.305 The APS incident 
exposed the organization as only a humanitarian organization and reaffirmed 
the mandate of the UNHCR, which is international protection and support of 
governments in the return and development process.306 The trend of voluntary 







The 58,211 refugees in 2015, as noted on the graph above, consist of 
10,294 families that were repatriated; however, it is quite interesting that 
women headed 20 percent of those repatriated families, whereas their 
husbands stayed back in Pakistan and for most, the reason was secure income 
in the country.308 This trend clearly depicts the shrinking asylum space in 
Pakistan, which is a significant contributor in the unprepared returns 
irrespective of the worsening security situation and lack of integration drivers 
inside Afghanistan. In 2016, the UNHCR had planned to assist 150,000 
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refugees through its repatriation operation.309 However, the figure has 
reached to 58,981 families, including 381,275 refugees, due to various 
factors, including (1) tight border management policy by the Government of 
Pakistan, (2) short-term extensions of the validity of PoR cards resulting in 
heightened anxiety and lack of predictability, (3) intensification of security 
operations in Pakistan against undocumented Afghan refugees under the 
National Action Plan (NAP) against terrorism, (4) a deteriorating protection 
environment for Afghans in Pakistan, (5) doubling of the voluntary 
repatriation and  reintegration cash grant, and (6) strong appeal for refugees 
return and proactive repatriation campaign by the President Ghani regime.310 
The extension of the legal stay of Afghan refugees until December 31, 
2017, is a prudent move by Islamabad. However, the Afghan refugee 
situation is at a critical juncture now in Pakistan. Currently, the political 
standoffishness between Afghanistan and Pakistan is acting as a primary 
factor, which generates certain other factors discussed above that put the 
Afghan refugees in a chaotic situation. The high repatriation numbers of 2016 
do not signify a high level of absorptive capacity in Afghanistan, both 
economically and socially. On the other hand, shrinking asylum space in 
Pakistan and short-term extensions of the validity of PoR cards resulted in 
heightened anxiety that compelled the Afghans to opt for repatriation. The 
emergence of ISIS and active movements of Taliban in certain cities of 
Afghanistan is another gargantuan threat for the Afghan government.311 
These same factors, coupled with the unstable socioeconomic situation and 
lack of livelihood sources, will be decisive factors for refugees in assessing 
repatriation as a durable solution. 
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E. Management and Repatriation Strategies for Afghan Refugees in 
Pakistan 
The Tripartite Commission Agreement focuses on the voluntary nature of 
repatriation and regulates repatriation of Afghan refugees;312 however, the 
protracted nature of the Afghan case required a shift in policy to manage the 
Afghan population in Pakistan and to explore possible alternatives for the 
unique nature of Afghan case load. In this context, two strategies were 
formulated for Afghan refugees, which are (1) the Afghan Management 
Repatriation Strategy (AMRS) 2010-2012, and (2) Solutions Strategy for 
Afghan Refugees (SSAR) 2013-2017. 
Voluntary repatriation is the core component of these two strategies.313 The 
formulation of these strategies reflected a sense of realism among policy 
makers that the complexity of the Afghan caseload required a broader lens to 
identify alternative solutions and to make feasible grounds for voluntary 
repatriation as a preferred durable solution. In order to manage the Afghan 
refugees and to view their repatriation and reintegration in a broader scope, a 
shift in policy by the Government of Pakistan was observed in 2008.314 The 
cabinet of Pakistan approved the repatriation strategy for Afghan refugees on 
May 9, 2007,with consultation of relevant stakeholders for the years 2007-
2009.315 However, the relevant stakeholders raised several reservations.316 In 
this context, the UNHCR focused on an open-ended policy and criticized the 
limited timeframe of the repatriation strategy.317 Similarly, the Government 
of Afghanistan also raised reservations and requested to review the numerical 
targets for repatriation in regards to a weak absorptive capacity and an 
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unpredictable security situation in Afghanistan.318 In order to review the 
strategy and to respond to the reservations, a meeting was held between the 
Prime Minister of Pakistan and the UNHCR in August 2008 to review the 
strategy for extension.319 Afterwards, on August 29, 2008, at the 15th 
Tripartite Commission Meeting at Islamabad, it was decided that the 
repatriation strategy would go beyond 2009 and would be linked with the 
Afghan National Development Strategy for the years 2009-2013.320 
Based on the announcements in the 15th Tripartite Commission meeting 
and in order to regulate repatriation and management of Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan, a revised management and repatriation strategy was introduced for 
the period of 2010-2012.321 The strategy was named the Afghan Management 
and Repatriation Strategy (AMRS). Inputs from all relevant stakeholders 
were included to cover all the issues related to Afghan refugees, including 
repatriation and reintegration.322 In March 2010, after consulting all 
government departments, the cabinet approved AMRS for the period of 2009-
2012, which inter alia extended the validity of PoR cards and the Tripartite 
Commission until December 2012.323 It was decided that AMRS would 
focused on the following areas:324 
 Repatriation to and reintegration of refugees in Afghanistan 
 International support for refugees and repatriation 
 Host community development 
 Development of refugee-affected areas 
 Addressing security concerns in Pakistan due to refugee presence 
 Border management/crossing to control recycling 
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 Constitution of a high-powered body to address Afghan refugee 
issues both in Pakistan and Afghanistan for durable solutions 
 Joint bilateral commission 
 Temporary management of Afghan refugees living in Pakistan 
during the period of 2010-2012 
The introduction of temporary management of Afghan refugees in Pakistan 
depicted a shift in policy by the Government of Pakistan; however, voluntary 
repatriation remained the core component of the management and 
repatriation strategy.325 AMRS clarified and reaffirmed the illegal status of 
undocumented Afghan citizens living in Pakistan.326 The undocumented 
Afghans would be deported and treated under the law of the land, which is 
the 1946 Foreigners Act of Pakistan.327 AMRS, in particular, focused on the 
legal status of Afghan students, female heads of households, and the Afghan 
investors in Pakistan.328 It was mentioned that those Afghans who had 
invested five million Pakistani Rupees (PKR) in a productive business would 
be issued work permits by Government of Pakistan.329 Similarly, groups of 
Afghans interested in bringing investments of over fifty million PKR would 
be welcomed and encouraged.330 In addition, Afghan students would be 
allowed to complete their education, and single women that have lost their 
breadwinners would be allowed to stay in Pakistan.331 To retain the effect of 
Afghan refugees on Pakistan’s labor market, it was decided that the 
Government of Pakistan would grant renewable visas to 150,000 skilled and 
unskilled Afghans living in Pakistan.332 
                                                 
325 Voluntary Repatriation Programme: Chamkani, supra note 198, at 1. 
326 Management and Repatriation Strategy, supra note 314, at 8. 
327 Id.at 9. 
328 Id. 
329 Id. at 8. 
330 Id. 
331 Id.at 9. 
332 Id. at 8. 
644 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
For implementation of AMRS, a High-Powered Body was established 
under the authority of the Minister of SAFRON.333 The body was chaired by 
the Minister of SAFRON and included the Chief Commissioner for Afghan 
Refugees, the Secretaries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs Ministries, and 
the representatives of other concerned departments.334 The High-Powered 
Body established five committees to guide the subjects of AMRS in a meeting 
held on December 2, 2010.335 The committees are as follows:336 
 Repatriationand Reintegration & Bilateral/Trilateral 
Consultations 
 Visas and Legal Residence Considerations & Regulations 
 Border Management and Exit/Entry Regime 
 Protection and Third Country Resettlement 
 Security and Legal Channels for Registration 
After forming the committees in the presence of the Home Secretary, the 
Chief Commissioner, the Joint Secretary of SAFRON, the UNHCR, and 
other relevant stakeholders, it was decided in a meeting to constitute 
province-based subcommittees.337 In this context, the Secretary of SAFRON 
designated provincial Home Secretaries to coordinate the subcommittees.338 
While revealing the achievement concerning AMRS, three strategic pillars 
were mentioned in a joint bulletin regarding AMRS, which was issued by the 
Ministry of SAFRON and the UNHCR in March 2011. The pillars are as 
follows:339 
 Socioeconomic profiling of registered Afghans in Pakistan. 
 Legal framework including accession to the 1951 Convention et 
al. 
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 Operational framework to implement solutions envisaged under 
AMRS. 
In regards to issuance of visas and work permits claimed in AMRS, the 
UNHCR mentioned that evidence-based data on vulnerability and economic 
status of Afghan families could be a constructive step in socioeconomic 
groupings.340 The data would also be capable of organizing voluntary 
repatriation and assisting the Government and the UNHCR Afghanistan in 
the reintegration of Afghan returnees.341 In this framework, the UNHCR 
Pakistan conducted two surveys, which are,342 (1) a pilot project on 
vulnerability entitled population, Profile and Verification (PPV) Survey 
(January-March 2011); and (2) the Afghan Citizens Contribution to Economy 
(ACCE) Survey. 
AMRS was a first-rate concept, but it remained a draft and the proper 
homework for its implementation was never done by the stakeholders. In 
order to give permits and permission for settlement of students and single 
women, a change in the law was required, which was not considered by the 
executives and stakeholders involved in the issue. The policy makers of 
AMRS were well aware that the complex nature of the Afghan case needed 
priority consideration by the governments of both countries. Consequently, 
policy makers linked the preferred durable solution (repatriation) with the 
Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) to create a pull factor in 
Afghanistan and to practice high-level communication between MoRR and 
the Ministry of SAFRON.343 The participants of AMRS also agreed upon the 
fact that “repatriation-at-once” in the case of Afghans was not feasible and it 
was decided that repatriation figures would be planned in accordance with 
the absorptive capacity of reintegration in Afghanistan.344 In this regard, a 
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stake for the Government of Pakistan was created in ANDS.345 It was a very 
vital step to understand the inhuman sufferings of returnees in a country 
where the absorptive capacity is below the required level. 
The implementation of AMRS was a huge challenge. In this regard, some 
efforts have been made, but have not been compelling enough to implement 
a strategy which covers all the issues related to Afghan’s case, including 
repatriation, reintegration, and temporary management of registered Afghan 
refugees living in Pakistan. The government of Afghanistan failed to create 
pull factors in Afghanistan due to minimal absorptive capacity, lack of 
infrastructural capacity, and a non-conducive environment.346 The 
Government of Pakistan was also unsuccessful in bringing policy level 
changes to prioritize the issue of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. In addition, 
unpleasant political relations between the two countries played a critical role 
in diverting attention from the most important regional issue. This situation 
was enough to confirm the failure of AMRS. 
The Afghan case is intricate and demanded solutions, which was the reason 
to revamp AMRS. Due to lack of legislation, a deficit of political will, and 
indecisive efforts for the management of Afghan refugees under the umbrella 
of AMRS in Pakistan, policy makers shifted their attention from management 
of refugees in the host country to sustainable reintegration of Afghan refugees 
in Afghanistan. The management and repatriation strategy was replaced by a 
regional solution strategy, SSAR, in May 2012.347 The governments of 
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Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan adopted the strategy.348 The inclusion of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran ensured that the Afghan case would be viewed as a 
regional issue.349 SSAR focused on voluntary repatriation, sustainable 
reintegration, and assistance to host communities to decrease the refugee 
fatigue in hosting areas.350 The governments of Afghanistan, Iran, and 
Pakistan, along with the UNHCR established the Quadripartite Steering 
Committee to coordinate, guide, and implement the strategy.351 The three 
main themes of SSAR are:352 
 Creating conditions conducive to voluntary repatriation through 
community-based investments in areas of high return. 
 Building Afghan refugee capital based on livelihood 
opportunities in Afghanistan in order to facilitate return. 
 Preserving asylum space in host countries, including enhanced 
support for refugee hosting communities, alternative temporary 
stay arrangements for the residual caseload, and resettlement in 
third countries. 
To address these subjects, it will be vital for the Quadripartite committee 
to establish a coordinated engagement of humanitarian actors and 
governments concerned, underpinned by a commitment to sustained and 
tangible support by the international community. SSAR adopted a systematic 
approach by including country specific portfolios in its overall policy 
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framework. Five outcomes were named to assess the implementation of the 
main subjects of SSAR:353 
 Support to voluntary repatriation. 
 Access to shelter and essential social services for refugees, 
returnees, and host communities. 
 Improved and diversified livelihood opportunities and enhanced 
food security. 
 Social and environmental protection of refugees, returnees, as 
well as assistance and support to host communities. 
 Capacity development of national authorities, associations, 
organizations, and communities concerned with refugees, 
returnees, and host communities. 
During a Quadripartite meeting held in Iran on May 9, 2015, the concerned 
governments and the UNHCR endorsed a second phase of SSAR, which is 
from 2015-2017, for the unremitting support to the safe, dignified, and 
voluntary return of Afghan refugees.354 SSAR is a well-structured regional 
approach to address the need for a conducive environment in Afghanistan for 
reintegration of returnees and investment in refugee-hosting areas to reduce 
hosting fatigue.355 The strategy focuses on support for Afghan refugees and 
prioritizes the needs of the Afghan population in each country to address the 
main pillars of SSAR.356 In Afghanistan, the focus would be on reintegration, 
and for this purpose, 48 pilot sites were identified in 19 high-return provinces 
to assist with shelter, social services, employment, and food security.357 
In this context, the UNHCR Afghanistan, along with MoRR, successfully 
coordinated with 12 of the line Ministers in 2012 to prioritize development 
of high-return zones via the National Priority Program.358 In order to support 
sustainable reintegration of returnees, Iran would launch programs, including 
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vocational trainings, to add a skilled labor force in the Afghan market, which 
would ultimately create a pull factor in Afghanistan.359 In responding to 
SSAR, Pakistan would emphasize voluntary repatriation and would support 
refugee-hosting communities in order to contribute to the third pillar of SSAR 
(Assistance to Host Communities).360 
Pakistan hosted the third regional Quadripartite Steering Committee 
meeting in Islamabad on September 18-19, 2013.361 All the relevant 
stakeholders and delegates from the three countries participated with the aim 
to strengthen cooperation, jointly mobilize resources, and to establish strong 
partnership with the international community to end the protracted Afghan 
refugee situation.362 The participants reaffirmed that the preferred durable 
solution for Afghan refugees is still voluntary repatriation; however, the 
sustainability of repatriation is contingent upon a conducive environment in 
Afghanistan.363 Furthermore, the parties to the SSAR confirmed unanimously 
that more funds and efforts are needed to achieve the goals of SSAR; 
whereas, the education and livelihood sectors need more attention and 
improvement in Afghanistan to create a pull factor for returnees.364 The 
Minister of SAFRON reassured the long-lasting commitment of Pakistan to 
the principle of voluntary and dignified return of Afghan refugees and urged 
the international community to invest more in the RAHA program.365 
The basic spirit for the implementation of SSAR is to invest in human 
capital in Afghanistan, via creating livelihood opportunities, and to 
compensate the refugees’ affected hosting areas.366 In 2014, to operationalize 
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SSAR, the concerned governments, along with their relevant humanitarian 
and development actors, developed country-specific portfolios.367 These 
portfolios provided a pragmatic and integrated framework for multilateral 
cooperation and focused particularly on the health, education, and livelihood 
sectors.368 However, each portfolio was unique and was designed in 
accordance to the country-specific realities.369 The implementation of these 
projects in a country-specific framework was structured within the five 
outcomes of SSAR in order to bring coherence and to ensure coordinated 
efforts.370 Coordination is imperative at the national and regional level among 
concerned authorities not only for implementation of the regional solution 
strategy but also to trace the progress of interventions and to guide the 
coordinated efforts. 
In this regard, National Steering Committees (NSCs) were established in 
respective countries to monitor and supervise the pace of interventions under 
the umbrella of SSAR.371 NSCs composed of representatives of key 
government ministries will guide the implementation of SSAR in the national 
spheres of concerned countries.372 In addition, platforms such as UN Country 
Team (UNCT), Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), and “Friends of SSAR” 
were established in Afghanistan to strengthen joint efforts in the context of 
SSAR.373 The UNHCR uses these platforms to create awareness regarding 
returnees’ issues in Afghanistan and work in close coordination with 
MoRR.374 “Friends of SSAR” was considered one of the best practices in 
Afghanistan and a valuable addition to SSAR.375 The platform recommends 
policy issues to the Government of Afghanistan and the UNHCR, which 
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includes integration of national policy framework, response gaps, and 
resource mobilization for reintegration activities.376 The establishment of 
such kinds of platforms justified the struggle of humanitarian actors for joint 
efforts to reintegrate returnees in Afghanistan. However, the successful and 
sustainable reintegration of returnees would only be possible if the 
Government of Afghanistan ensured a conducive environment for return and 
humanitarian space for interventions. 
Pakistan effectively continues its contribution by implementing RAHA 
interventions to the third pillar (Assistance to host communities) of SSAR.377 
The revision and extension of the RAHA program until 2017 in line with 
SSAR was endorsed by participating countries in early May 2015.378 RAHA 
is a government-led initiative in Pakistan and a joint program with the 
UNHCR.379 The RAHA program is an integral component of SSAR and the 
government’s management and repatriation strategy for Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan.380 It remains a primary solidarity platform for maintaining 
temporary protection space and enhanced community acceptance of refugees 
in Pakistan.381 In this context, it is essential for international donors to invest 
in RAHA to create asylum space in hosting countries and to support 
developmental interventions inside Afghanistan for a planned and sustainable 
return of refugees.382 Since its launch, nearly 3,500 RAHA projects have been 
implemented across the country, in the sectors of health, infrastructure, 
livelihoods, water and sanitation, education, and social protection benefitting 
over 10.6 million people.383 RAHA interventions promote communal 
approaches and also mobilize and empower communities.384 In this regard, a 
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total of 3,390 community organizations, 285 village organizations, and 24 
local support organizations are now actively engaged in planning and 
implementing projects related to social services and infrastructure.385 
RAHA interventions particularly focused on primary health, education, 
and capacity building of poor and vulnerable individuals through skill 
development in saleable trades.386 In this perspective, an estimated 50 percent 
of the total targeted 4,935 individuals were trained and engaged in income-
generating trades.387 Primary health care services were provided to nearly 
580,000 patients in Afghan refugee villages across the provinces of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, and Punjab through Basic Health Units 
(BHUs).388 Free primary education was provided to over 71,000 refugee 
children in 54 refugee villages in Pakistan.389 Access to free primary 
education was ensured through 174 conventional schools, 4,848satellite 
classrooms, and 13 early child education centers, with a total of 1,455 
teachers.390 In this regard, particular attention was given to girls’ education 
by focusing on increasing girls’ enrollment and retention.391 
Being a host of 62 percent392 of registered and thousands of undocumented 
Afghan refugees in Pakistan, a total of 38 RAHA projects worth 
approximately $7.43 million were implemented in 2015 in the province of 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.393 To implement RAHA interventions, approximately 
$32.036 million was spent from 2009 to 2015 in the major hosting province 
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.394 
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Resettlement is an integral component of SSAR and one of the three 
durable solutions.395 It is not only an appropriate protection tool for those 
Afghan refugees who are unable to return and unable to stay in principal 
hosting states, but also serves as an expression of solidarity on the part of 
international community.396 Resettlement of Afghan refugees has remained a 
priority of the UNHCR in the implementation of SSAR and is considered as 
an important subject of the country-specific portfolios of Iran and Pakistan.397 
For the year 2015, 2,200 places were secured for resettlement from Pakistan, 
particularly to the United States of America, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand.398 Compared to this target number, 1,242 cases of Afghan refugees 
were filed by the end of August 2015.399 These cases included extremely 
vulnerable Afghan refugees, such as chronic medical conditions, survivors of 
violence and torture, and female-headed households, etc. 
The required implementation budget of SSAR for 2015-2016 was one 
billion dollars.400 The outcomes of SSAR were prioritized by allotting the 
required budget to each outcome. In this regard, SSAR allotted $573 million 
for access to essential services and shelter, $180 million for livelihood and 
food security, $112 million for social and environmental protection and 
resettlement, $162 million for voluntary repatriation, and $21 million for 
capacity development.401 
 
1. A Comparison of AMRS and SSAR 
AMRS was more focused on management of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, 
while SSAR focuses on voluntary repatriation, reintegration in Afghanistan, 
and development of refugee-affected areas in Pakistan. However, the 
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effective implementation of these strategies will only be possible if the 
Afghan refugee issue becomes a priority case of all three concerned 
governments: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. The voluntary nature of 
repatriation remains at the heart of Pakistan’s National Refugee Policy, 
reflecting a sense of realism among policymakers and an awareness that 
Afghanistan’s poor law-and-order situation and shortage of livelihood 
opportunities remain very significant hurdles to repatriation and sustainable 
reintegration inside Afghanistan. To find solutions for the protracted 
displacement of Afghan refugees, progress cannot be achieved without the 
support of the international community. The support of SSAR and the 
implementation of the Enhanced Voluntary Return and Reintegration 
Package (EVRRP) will be decisive contributors to the sustainable 
reintegration in Afghanistan. 
V. A WAY FORWARD 
Presenting solutions for a protracted refugee situation has always been 
challenging. The back-and-forth movements of Afghan refugees between the 
country of origin and principal state of asylum, lack of legislation regarding 
refugees in Pakistan, and the ad hoc nature of various announcements and 
notifications by the policy makers in Pakistan made it a complex case to be 
resolved.  This study attempted to classify suggestions in the mentioned 
categories in order to highlight the operating areas for the concerned 
governments, international political players, and humanitarian actors, 
including UN agencies. 
A. Recommendations for International Political Players 
Political issues need political resolutions. The primary root cause of the 
migration of Afghans was, initially, political instability—which was later 
accelerated by the USSR invasion, civil war, Talibanization, and the US-led 
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military intervention.402 In this context, it is important for stakeholders to note 
that political stability and the establishment of the government’s writ in 
Afghanistan is the only way to attract returnees. The role of humanitarian 
actors, including the UN agencies, is limited given their narrow scope, and is 
restricted to supporting the governments in the return and development 
process. Afghan refugees need international attention more than ever before, 
and the utmost priority should be given to the resolution of this protracted 
humanitarian crisis in any future political settlement regarding Afghanistan. 
Pakistan, India, China, and the United States should closely cooperate 
and contribute to the international strategy for stabilization in 
Afghanistan, including the fostering of Afghan-Pakistan amity. Pakistan 
is not only a neighbor of Afghanistan sharing a very long border, but also has 
been hosting Afghan refugees since Russian invasion. The bond is stronger 
due to same tribes living on both sides of the border. The landlocked nature 
of geographical boundaries is making Pakistan the easiest route to trade with 
the international market for Afghanistan. The reality of the situation is 
making Afghanistan a very important determinant of Pakistan’s foreign 
policy. Therefore, restoring peace in Afghanistan is of high importance for 
international power players like the United States and China, and regional 
players like Pakistan and Iran. 
The issue of Afghan refugees needs to be a priority issue for both 
governments irrespective of the political tensions between the two 
governments. The major constraints in voluntary repatriation should not be 
addressed through responsibility shifting. In order to deal with the protracted 
case of Afghan refugees, it is imperative for the governments of Afghanistan 
and Pakistan to practice regular exchange of information, to encourage 
efforts, and to develop a sustainable, integrated approach among UN 
agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and concerned 
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governments authorities (MoRR and Ministry of SAFRON) to implement a 
comprehensive solutions strategy. 
Pakistan needs an international push to end the protracted refugee 
situation. The international community must redouble its efforts to support 
Afghan refugees and should express solidarity not only in resettling Afghan 
refugees but also to finance the RAHA interventions in order to support the 
hosting communities who have welcomed, hosted, and supported Afghan 
refugees for over 37 years in Pakistan. 
B. Recommendations for the Government of Afghanistan 
The repatriation must be linked with the national development and 
favorable conditions in Afghanistan. The returnees’ concerns and qualms 
regarding sustainable reintegration should be allied with the National Priority 
Programs (NPP). It is essential to ensure the inclusion of SSAR’s outcomes 
in NPP. Furthermore, the need for assessment of returnees in the host country 
would be decisive and favorable not only in terms of facilitating returnees 
through NPP interventions, but also to highlight the actual needs of returnees 
that could guide and drive the NPP. Despite the existence of an exit 
questionnaire in VRCs, information on the needs assessments of returnees 
are still deficient, containing loop holes in coordination mechanisms between 
the concerned quarters of the two countries. 
Security and economic concerns are the two most significant reasons 
for the continued exile of Afghan refugees. Both of these concerns are 
entirely dependent upon political stability in Afghanistan. Recently, the 
complex transition has largely affected the willingness to return of Afghan 
refugees.403 Most of the refugees decided to postpone their return and adopted 
wait-and-see policy in order to get a better picture of the impact of 
presidential elections.404 
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Corruption remains endemic in Afghanistan, which is a huge 
challenge in transforming foreign investments into pull factors for 
returnees. The government of Afghanistan must root out corruption and 
incompetency in order to strengthen and streamline its institutions. There is 
a need for transformational shifts in relevant institutions in terms of strength 
and capacity to curb different forms of corruption hindering reintegration. 
Priority must be given to extremely vulnerable, poor, and less 
influential returnees in Afghanistan rather than powerful lobbies and 
their supporters. Provisions and practices that discriminate against the most 
vulnerable and impoverished landless returnees should be curbed. Besides 
that, the UNHCR Afghanistan, MoRR, and DoRR should speedup 
registration, tracking, and mapping of returnees at places of origin in order to 
address and fulfill their needs for sustainable reintegration. 
Land disputes and land encroachment issues must be resolved in 
Afghanistan. Land disputes are long-pending and complex issues faced by 
returnees in Afghanistan. However, the resolution of these issues needs 
commitment, strong coordination, and rule of law in Afghanistan. UNHCR 
Pakistan, along with CAR offices, can refer land-confiscated cases to MoRR, 
DoRR, and UNHCR Afghanistan. In this regard, UNHCR Pakistan and CAR, 
along with Implementing Partners (IPs), need to maintain information about 
proper records of land-dispute cases. These cases can be shared through an 
extensive sharing mechanism with the concerned organizations (working on 
legal assistance) through UNHCR Afghanistan with the collaboration of 
MoRR and DoRR. 
Lack of community acceptance, ethnicity issues, and lack of harmony 
still exist in Afghanistan. The government of Afghanistan can address these 
issues with the fair and nondiscriminatory distribution of resources. 
Furthermore, the intertribal tolerance among different lingual and multiethnic 
groups could reach the highest level if fair and equal distribution of assistance 
to returnees is maintained by the humanitarian actors, including UN agencies. 
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The issues of landlessness and urbanization need immense efforts in 
Afghanistan. A transparent approach is required in terms of allotting plots in 
the Land Allocation Scheme (LAS) with the coordinated efforts of other 
humanitarian organizations, including UN agencies, in order to ensure fair 
distribution of land. In the future, the number of reintegration sites needs to 
be increased by UNHCR Afghanistan in the provinces where the returnees’ 
arrivals are high. Besides that, the reintegration sites need to be fully 
equipped, at least with basic services, which not only address the needs of 
returnees but also plays a role in the discouragement of urbanization of 
returnees. In this regard, it is important to make available viable land 
schemes, sponsored by the government, in order to support comprehensive 
reintegration interventions with livelihood strategies to ensure sustainability 
in return. In addition, plots in the LAS should be distributed fairly and should 
not be associated with certain social groups such as teachers, doctors, 
parliamentarians, judges, etc. 
The three main needs of returnees in Afghanistan are access to shelter, 
land, and livelihood opportunities. These needs are somehow the subject 
of international donors and humanitarian actors; however, they are dependent 
upon the security situation in Afghanistan, and provision of a secure 
environment is the utmost responsibility of the Government of Afghanistan 
and international political players. The Afghan government could only 
convince international donors to intervene in Afghanistan if it ensures access 
of beneficiaries to interventions by creating a secure and conducive 
environment. 
C. Recommendations for Humanitarian Actors 
The UNHCR Afghanistan policy of intervening in high-return areas 
should be reviewed to include comparatively peaceful areas in order to 
also make those areas livable and attractive for returnees. In this regard, 
significant efforts and investment are needed in the sectors of health and 
education by humanitarian organizations in rural areas. The attention of 
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humanitarian actors will not only create a pull factor, but will also reduce the 
urbanization trend among returnees, which is a huge challenge for the Afghan 
government in the current setup of rehabilitation. 
The investment in human development in Afghanistan requires joint 
efforts by humanitarian actors and concerned government authorities to 
create synergies. Certainly, it is a challenging task for the Afghan 
government to invest in human development; however, a pull factor can be 
created through provision or creation of livelihood opportunities and 
humanitarian space in a country where every fifth citizen is a returnee. 
Afghanistan should be considered in a state of conflict, which still 
requires huge efforts in the humanitarian and development sectors. The 
focus on the dilemma of Afghanistan should not be diverted to other newly 
aroused crises around the globe in terms of budget allocations. 
The Enhanced Voluntary Return and Reintegration Package 
(EVRRP) must be implemented. This multipurpose cash grant has the 
capacity to create a compelling pull factor in Afghanistan for returnees, which 
will ultimately ensure the sustainability of reintegration. A step towards joint 
resource mobilization, led by Afghanistan with the support of Pakistan and 
UNHCR, for EVRRP shows the willingness of the parties. However, budget 
constraints and corruption would be huge hurdles in the implementation. The 
successful implementation of SSAR could only contribute to one of its main 
themes (repatriation) if the stakeholders ensure the voluntariness and 
sustainability in repatriation via implementation of EVRRP. 
D. Recommendations for the Government of Pakistan 
The protracted nature of the Afghan case demands legislation in 
Pakistan. The majority of Afghan refugees living in Pakistan are youth.405 In 
this context, it is very essential to bring the Afghan refugees in to the national 
sphere and to consider them part of Pakistan’s socioeconomic system. 
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Certainly, the emphasis on sustainable reintegration in Afghanistan and 
assistance to host communities in the current regional solution strategy 
(SSAR) is a constructive approach; however, none of the solution strategies 
can work if the needs of the second or even third generation refugees are not 
addressed, particularly in terms of local integration in the host country. 
Urban refugee management is a weak link in the overall refugee 
framework in Pakistan. The lack of management is creating administrative, 
social, and legal issues not only for the government and humanitarian actors, 
but also for the genuine refugees overall. In the past, while formulating 
policies for refugees, the emphasis of the government and the UNHCR was 
extensively on the refugees residing in camps. Currently, almost 70 percent 
of the PoR cardholders are living outside the camps, mostly as urban 
refugees.406 As a result, there is a visible disconnect between the Provincial 
Commissionerates and the refugees. Provincial Commissionerates are 
designed and trained for camp management in Pakistan.407 There is no policy 
or any formal mechanism to effectively manage the out-of-camp or urban 
refugees.408 Thus, in the absence of any clear policy and necessary outreach, 
urban refugees in Pakistan are facing countless dilemmas. This is purely an 
issue of management that needs to be addressed for the welfare of Afghan 
refugees. It is, therefore, important to have an Urban Refugee Policy, which 
will provide institutional guidelines for effective management of urban 
refugees. The Ministry of SAFRON along with the UNHCR, in this respect, 
should devise an urban refugee management policy in Pakistan. 
The undocumented or unregistered Afghan refugees are in a nowhere 
situation in both countries. Only those Afghan returnees who have 
Voluntary Repatriation Forms (VRF) are entitled to receive the UNHCR and 
MoRR assistance in Afghanistan.409 Similarly, the undocumented Afghan 
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refugees in Pakistan are not the persons of concern of any humanitarian 
organization, including the UNHCR, and are the subject of the 1946 
Foreigner’s Act of Pakistan. It is therefore important to include such kinds of 
returnees in the National Priority Program (NPP), without discrimination, 
because otherwise they would be compelled to become recyclers in Pakistan. 
The government of Pakistan should grant visas or register the undocumented 
Afghans living in Pakistan. It is not only significant for security measures in 
Pakistan but will also capture a clear image of resources utilized by the 
overall Afghan population in Pakistan. 
The legal stay of Afghan refugees must be long-term in Pakistan. The 
government of Pakistan is well aware of the complexity of the Afghan case, 
and in this regard, the short-term temporary legal stay will not only misuse 
the resources through issuance of new PoR cards but will also create impasses 
in the implementation of an in-practice regional solution strategy. The 
Government of Pakistan must allow Afghan refugees for a long-term 
temporary legal stay in Pakistan. A realistic deadline for repatriation should 
be linked with the absorptive capacity of Afghanistan with no compromise 
on the principles of voluntarism and gradualism. 
 
 
 
